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THE HUNKIEST LITTLE WHOREHOUSE IN TOWN IS
LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN, BUT ONLY TO WORK
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HEIDI FLEISS'S
FEMALE BROTHEL
"Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. "1
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost two decades, Heidi Fleiss caused Hollywood both
pleasure and pain.2 During her reign as the Hollywood Madam,
she allegedly possessed a little black book containing the names
and sexual preferences of prominent entertainment industry lead-
ers.3 Public disclosure of the book's contents threatened to destroy
careers and reputations if names became public, but no such book
ever materialized. 4 Heidi Fleiss's prostitution empire ultimately dis-
solved after her conviction for money laundering, pandering, and
tax evasion. 5
The adult entertainment industry, however, has not heard the
last of Heidi Fleiss. She has re-emerged to create the country's first
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (arguing personal liberties
include intimate conduct).
2. See Shawn Hubler, Fleiss Plans a Brothel to Serve Women, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2005, at BI (mentioning that Heidi Fleiss became infamous in 1990s for running
prostitution ring for entertainment industry businessmen). "I took the oldest pro-
fession on Earth and I did it better than anyone on Earth .... " Then & Now: Heidi
Fleiss, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/28/cnn25.tan.fleiss (quoting
Fleiss on her notoriety as madam in 1990s).
3. See Steve Friess, Betting on the Studs, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005, at 44 (refer-
ring to Heidi Fleiss as "former Hollywood Madam Heidi Fleiss"). Hollywood buz-
zed with rumors of who comprised Fleiss's client list; the most high-profiled star
exposed as a client was Charlie Sheen. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2
(mentioning most famous person named as client of Fleiss's call girl service); see
also Rotten.com, Biographies: Heidi Fleiss, http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/
misc/heidi-fleiss/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (referring to rumors of book contain-
ing names of studio heads, actors, and other prominent entertainment figures).
Fleiss's clients also included "individuals who ran countries or whose actions could
easily alter global economies." Id. The little black book purportedly contained the
names, contact information, sexual preferences, and the amount of money paid to
Fleiss. See id. Fleiss later "admitted there was no little black book." See id.
4. See Rotten.com, Biographies: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 3 (clarifying that little
black book was unfounded rumor).
5. See Hubler, supra note 2 (listing charges for which Fleiss was convicted).
Fleiss served twenty-one months in prison and was released in 1999. See id.
(77)
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brothel for female customers. 6 Known as Heidi's Stud Farm, the
brothel was originally scheduled to open by April 2006 in Crystal,
Nevada. 7 Fleiss hopes to create "an exotic, unique experience: per-
fect for bachelorette parties or for women wanting uncomplicated,
STD-free hookups."
One of the Stud Farm's initial policies, however, threatens to
expose the business to legal challenges before its doors open for
business.9 The Stud Farm will offer only female-to-male sexual ser-
6. See Friess, supra note 3 (highlighting that Fleiss's brothel will be first legal
brothel offering services for female customers). It is estimated to be a "$1.5 mil-
lion sexual fantasyland." Id. Moreover, the Stud Farm will provide further en-
tertainment to Home Box Office ("HBO") viewers; Heidi Fleiss signed a deal with
HBO for the filming of a documentary about the brothel's birth. See Heidi Fleiss
'Stud Farm' Documentary to Air on HBO, http://www.starpulse.com/news/in-
dex.php/2005/12/01/heidifleiss studfarm-documentary-toai (Dec. 1, 2005,
11:00:21). The film will focus on everything Fleiss encounters, from the construc-
tion of the brothel to the hiring of the men. See id.
7. See Hubler, supra note 2 (stating Heidi Fleiss's plans for brothel will be first
in state to serve only female customers). Heidi Fleiss's business partner notified
Nye County licensing officials of the pair's intentions, adding that the fee for one
of Fleiss's studs will be $250 per hour. See id. Fleiss noted several predictors of the
Farm's success included that "'[w]omen are more independent these days; they
make more money and it's hard to meet people'...." Id. In a letter to the county
licensing board, Fleiss's business partner claimed that the brothel would "'address
an ever-increasing fact of life,' because 'society is witnessing a unique evolution of
the female gender reaching out for the same service we now offer male clients."'
Id.; see also Friess, supra note 3 (pointing out name for Heidi Fleiss's new enter-
prise); Heidi's Stud Farm, http://www.heidifleiss.com/phpform/use/studemploy-
ment/forml.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (estimating date of opening). As of
October 16, 2006, Fleiss's website proclaimed that the Stud Farm is in its beginning
phase of development and will continue to post updates of its progress online. See
Heidi's Stud Farm, supra.
8. Friess, supra note 3 (citing Fleiss) (stating goal of brothel). Erotic en-
tertainment options such as sex toy parties and strip clubs aside, some claim that a
large market exists for male prostitutes. See Mireya Navarro, The West Gets Wilder,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 9, at 1. "'We get offered all the time, [h]ow much for
this guy?' said Dan Remington, an owner of 'Hollywood Men,' a show of male
strippers in Hollywood." Id. The Stud Farm expects to employ twenty men with
ten more on stand-by. See Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7 (describing staffing
plans at brothel). The $250 per hour fee will be split fifty-fifty with the brothel, but
the studs will keep all tips. See Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7. In addition, the
men will be charged a weekly fee which will cover the cost of a housekeeper, lodg-
ing, and food. See Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7 (providing Stud Farm employ-
ment details). Finally, Fleiss will require the studs to submit to weekly tests for
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. See Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7
(explaining requirements for working at brothel).
9. See Friess, supra note 3 (introducing potential legal hurdle Fleiss could
face). Nevada Assemblyman David R. Parks, also a homosexual man, plans to ask
for a legal opinion as to whether Fleiss's plan to prohibit male customers from
hiring her studs violates a Nevada anti-bias law. See id. Parks, a Democrat, repre-
sents Clark County, Nevada. See Nevada Legislature, http://leg.state.nv.us/73rd/
legislators/Assembly/PARKS.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). He has been an As-
semblyman for eight years, the Democratic Assistant Majority Whip in 1999, the
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vices.10 Heidi Fleiss's web site proclaims: "This establishment will
hire men to service women. There will be no male-to-male sexual
services offered."' I This policy does not bar homosexual men from
working at the Stud Farm, but it does prohibit them from patroniz-
ing the Stud Farm.1 2 Therefore, Heidi Fleiss's Stud Farm policy
prohibiting male-to-male homosexual acts discriminates against ho-
mosexual men as patrons.' 3
This Comment examines the potential legal challenges Heidi
Fleiss may face as a result of her discriminatory policy excluding
homosexual men as customers of her brothel, as well as the possible
defenses she can raise. Part II offers an overview of the legalized
brothel industry, the economic impact that industry has on Nevada,
and Heidi Fleiss's rise to infamy.14 Part III dissects the legal claims
at issue, including: homosexuals as a protected class, the public ac-
commodation requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 versus
the private club exemption, and the doctrine of state action.' 5 Part
IV concludes by offering the most pragmatic view of the counterat-
tack against legal challenges Heidi Fleiss's Stud Farm may face. 16
Democratic Assistant Majority Floor Leader in 2001, and he has held numerous
other leadership positions. See id. (listing credentials of legislator).
10. See Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7 (describing to potential employees
what it would be like to work at Stud Farm). In the United States, male escorts
"overwhelmingly cater to gay clients... Navarro, supra note 8 (recognizing that
market for gay social and sexual services already exists).
11. Heidi's Stud Farm, supra note 7 (quoting Stud Farm policy prohibiting
sexual services for male customers).
12. See id. (making inference from post on Fleiss's stud application form). In
1994, John Reese, former president of Nevadans Against Prostitution, announced
plans to open Nevada's first gay brothel. See ALEXA ALBERT, BROTHEL: MUSTANG
RANCH AND ITS WOMEN 174 (2001) (introducing first mention of gay brothel as
business venture). His reasoning was that "brothels are a good place for gays to go
to have safe sex." Id. He sees Nevada's potential as the "gay prostitution capital of
the nation." Id. Further, Reese predicted that Nevada would have as many as ten
gay brothels by 1999 because the Nevada state government repealed statutes
criminalizing homosexual conduct in 1993. See id. Moreover, the brothel industry
could not openly oppose a gay brothel without being viewed as discriminatory. See
id. When Nye County commissioners turned down Reese's application for lacking
certain information, Reese withdrew his proposal. See id. at 175.
13. See Friess, supra note 3 (deducing that brothel policy of prohibiting male-
to-male services may be discriminatory toward homosexual men). However, Fleiss
indicated that "she may target the gay market next." Id.
14. For a further discussion of the rise of the legalized brothel industry in
Nevada, see infra notes 17-77. For a further discussion of Heidi Fleiss's back-
ground, see infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the three constitutional issues addressed in this
Comment, see infra notes 116-353 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion, see infra notes 352-53 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Nevada Brothel Industry
1. The Rise of the Brothel Industry
Originally, Nevada did not embrace the brothel industry;
rather, it tolerated the industry for nearly a century before its legali-
zation. 17 Brothels in the Wild West have operated since the gold
and silver rush days of the mid-to-late 1800s. 18 As miners headed
west, prostitutes followed and remained welcome in towns where
men far outnumbered women.19 In fact, Nevada residents consider
several prominent frontier prostitutes to be important founding
citizens.20
When families started migrating west, Nevada lawmakers recog-
nized that controlling prostitution required regulating it.21 Legisla-
tors passed the first prostitution control legislation in 1881, giving
county commissioners the power to license, tax, and regulate broth-
els. 22 In 1937, the Nevada state government itself became involved
in brothel oversight for the first time by launching an aggressive
program to curtail sexually transmitted diseases.23
Limited regions of Reno and Las Vegas remained hubs of le-
galized prostitution until 1942, when President Franklin D.
17. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 36 (announcing state's view of brothel indus-
try before legalizing it). In Elko, Nevada, Mona's II, a legalized brothel, has oper-
ated since 1902. See id.
18. See id. (noting era when brothels came into existence in Nevada). Califor-
nia, Arizona, and Colorado also tolerated brothels during mining days. See id.
19. See id. (describing one reason why legalized prostitution took hold in Ne-
vada). Brothels flourished, with over one hundred and fifty operating at one time
in Virginia City, Nevada. See id.
20. See id. at 37 (reporting that some Nevadans consider founding prostitutes
as legends). For example, Julia Bulette gained popularity in her community for
her civic contributions. See id. She became an honorary firefighter and a railroad
car was named after her. See id.
21. See id. (indicating point when Nevada legislators realized they needed to
regulate prostitution in brothels).
22. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 37-38 (announcing first Nevada law passed to
control legalized prostitution). At the urging of community groups, legislators
passed laws barring brothels from main business routes and within four hundred
yards of schools and churches. See id. at 38. Guy Louis Rocha, State Archivist for
the Nevada State Library and Archives, reports that the first attempt at legalizing
prostitution was in 1871. See Guy Louis Rocha, Brothels of Nevada, http://
www.nvbrothels.net/infoHistory.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). The regulation
required a monthly license for brothels and health certificates for prostitutes. See
id.
23. See Rocha, supra note 22 (announcing launch of Nevada program to con-
trol sexually transmitted diseases). At the time, prostitutes were required to have
weekly medical exams. See id. The exams also checked for gonorrhea while
monthly exams checked for syphilis. See id.
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Roosevelt forced states to prohibit prostitution near military ba-
ses.24 Brothel regulation returned to Nevada's counties at the end
of World War 11.25 Since then, Nevada has consistently regulated
the health of the state's prostitutes. 26
At the time the federal government withdrew its regulation of
Nevada's brothels, casinos in Reno and Las Vegas thrived. 27 Las
Vegas and Reno city officials attempted to improve the cities'
images by separating themselves from organized crime and prosti-
tution.28 To this end, county commissioners closed Mae Cunning-
ham's well-known Reno brothel with the support of a judge who
ruled that brothels were public nuisances. 29 In response, rural
lawmakers who favored brothels quickly signed a bill that gave
counties local discretion to legalize brothels. 30 The governor of Ne-
vada, however, vetoed the bill under pressure from casino owners. 31
Citing Mae Cunningham v. Washoe County, Reno and Las Vegas offi-
cials permanently closed their red-light districts in 1951.32
24. SeeALBERT, supra note 12, at 38 (listing Nevada cities where legalized pros-
titution was most popular). Block 16 became Las Vegas' red-light district and
Stockade became Reno's. See id. Roosevelt feared that syphilis and other sexually
transmitted diseases would incapacitate the troops. See id. at 38-39.
25. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 39 (pointing to end of federal suppression of
brothels in Nevada).
26. See Rocha, supra note 22 (recognizing long history of state oversight of
prostitutes' health).
27. See id. (introducing start of outlawing legalized prostitution in Reno and
Las Vegas).
28. See id. (continuing discussion about why prostitution is illegal in Reno and
Las Vegas). Officials wanted to avoid a federal investigation of gambling opera-
tions. See id. Today, some critics argue that legal brothels are not good for Ne-
vada's image. See id. Steve Wynn, former owner of the Golden Nugget, Treasure
Island, Mirage, and Belagio casinos, said brothels pose a risk to the tourism and
gaming revenues. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 180.
29. See Rocha, supra note 22 (announcing first legal battle over closure of
brothel as public nuisance). In Mae Cunningham v. Washoe County, the judge ex-
plained that county commissioners and district attorneys had the power to close
brothels as public nuisances, even though Nevada had no statute expressly forbid-
ding prostitution. See id. (citing Cunningham v. Washoe County, 203 P.2d 611,
613-14 (Nev. 1949)). However, in Nye County v. Plankinton, the Nevada Supreme
Court held that in "counties having a statutory licensing scheme" for brothels,
brothels were not public nuisances per se. See id. (citing Nye County v. Plankinton,
587 P.2d 421, 423 (Nev. 1978)).
30. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 39 (expressing reaction of lawmakers to clo-
sure of Reno brothel as public nuisance).
31. See id. (asserting end of initial effort to make legalization of brothels
county-by-county decision).
32. See id. (mentioning final closure of brothels in Reno and Las Vegas). City
officials relied on the rationale of the court in the Mae Cunningham case to main-
tain that brothels were public nuisances. See id.
5
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In 1955, Joe Conforte revived the Nevada brothel industry
when he moved from California to Nevada with plans to exploit the
state's porous prostitution laws. 3 3 Initially, Conforte encountered
resistance when he tried to establish a brothel in Reno.3 4 He relo-
cated to Storey County, outside of Reno's Washoe County, and
opened the Triangle River Ranch. 35 Five months later, Conforte
joined forces with Sally Burgess, a former brothel operator, and to-
gether they bought three more brothels. 36
Meanwhile, Conforte's intentional mockery of Washoe
County's law prohibiting prostitution enraged Washoe County Dis-
trict Attorney William Raggio.3 7 Raggio persuaded Storey County
officials to use the Cunningham precedent to close the Triangle
River Ranch as a public nuisance.3 8 Incredibly, Raggio then set fire
to the brothel, claiming he had a right to burn it down because it
was a public nuisance.3 9 In response, Conforte consolidated his
brothel business into one trailer and located it at the corner of
Washoe, Storey, and Lyon Counties; when officials from one county
threatened to close the brothel, Conforte simply moved the trailer
across the county line into a neighboring county. 40
33. See id. at 40 (introducing Joe Conforte to legalized prostitution scene in
Nevada). Conforte was a Sicilian immigrant who had been a cabdriver and pimp
in Oakland, California. See id. (providing Conforte's background).
34. See id. (claiming Conforte's Reno brothel struggled for acceptance).
35. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 40 (explaining Conforte's next step in estab-
lishing brothel).
36. See id. (tracing rise of Conforte's brothel empire). Sally Burgess would
later become Conforte's wife. See id.
37. See id. (examining feud between Conforte and local district attorney).
Conforte prompted the battle by flaunting his money and women throughout
Reno. See id. In response, District Attorney Raggio charged Conforte with va-
grancy whenever Conforte entered Reno. See id. at 41. Further, Raggio instructed
Reno's casinos and restaurants to refuse service to Conforte. See id. In response,
Conforte crafted a plot to catch Raggio buying alcohol for an underage girl and
then having sex with her. See id. Conforte then threatened to expose Raggio un-
less he withdrew the vagrancy charges. See id. Unfortunately for Conforte, Raggio
taped the threatening conversation. See id. Officers arrested Conforte for at-
tempted extortion of a public official and he served twenty-two months in prison.
See id. at 42; see also Mustang Ranch Chronology, Reno Gazette J., Aug. 8, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.rgj.com/news/stories/html/2002/11/29/29072.php (announc-
ing prison sentence Conforte served).
38. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 41 (detailing ongoing fight between Conforte
and Raggio).
39. See id. (offering more details of dispute between Conforte and Raggio).
Raggio set fire to the Conforte brothel with both the Storey County District Attor-
ney and local fire department chief present. See id. Ironically, the brothel sat
outside of Raggio's jurisdiction. See id.
40. See id. at 41-42 (recognizing solution Conforte created).
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Later, while Conforte served a three year prison sentence for
tax evasion, newcomer Richard Bennett persuaded Storey County
commissioners to permit him to open the Mustang Bridge Ranch
brothel.41 Angered by Bennett's recent success in the brothel busi-
ness, and hoping to force Bennett to sell, Conforte launched a
comeback which included several fires at Bennett's brothel, and the
detonation of a bridge near the Mustang Bridge Ranch. 42 His plan
worked; in 1967 Conforte purchased the Mustang Bridge Ranch. 43
Even though Conforte possessed economic power, he wanted
political power as well. In an effort to create more sympathetic
county officials, Conforte increased the size of a nearby housing
development. 44 Conforte expected tenants to vote in his favor in
local elections in exchange for lower rent.45 Regular political con-
tributions further cemented Conforte's local political power.46 He
drew upon this political power to strongly advocate for Storey
County's passage of the United States' first brothel-licensing ordi-
nance. 47 To help officials defend the ordinance, Conforte pro-
posed exorbitant licensing fees so as to create a financial hardship
for the county if it did not legalize prostitution. 48 Subsequently,
prostitution became legal in Storey County on January 1, 1971. 4 9
41. See id. at 42 (showing attempt by outsider to enter Storey County brothel
scene).
42. See id. (detailing Conforte's self-proclaimed comeback).
43. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 42 (announcing how Conforte gained con-
trol of competitor's brothel). Conforte changed the brothel's name to the Mus-
tang Ranch. See Mustang Ranch Chronology, supra note 37 (describing name
change). In April 1977, federal agents arrested and charged Conforte with income
tax evasion. See id. He faced a five year minimum sentence, and appealed. See id.
After the United States Supreme Court rejected a review of his tax evasion convic-
tion, Conforte fled the United States. See id. Conforte returned to the country in
1983, bargained for a reduced sentence, and testified against a judge in a bribery
and tax evasion case. See id. In 1990, the Internal Revenue Service siezed the Mus-
tang Ranch and ran the business in an effort to recover back taxes. See id. Those
plans failed and federal agents closed the Ranch's doors permanently. See id. (tell-
ing end of Mustang Ranch).
44. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 42-43 (noting one way Conforte increased his
political power).
45. See id. at 43 (detailing arrangement as implicit).
46. See id. (concluding that Conforte succeeded in achieving political strength
in Storey County).
47. See id. (introducing Conforte's efforts to get local officials to legalize
brothel operations).
48. See id. (stating Conforte's introduction of legalized brothel ordinances
and licensing fees). He recommended an annual fee of $18,000, which eventually
increased to $25,000. See id. As of 2000, the annual fee increased to $100,000. See
id. For a further discussion of brothel regulations, licensing, and fees, see infra
notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
49. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 43 (stating date when prostitution became
legal). The Nevada Supreme Court upheld Storey County's right to legalize prosti-
7
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Fiery reactions ensued throughout Nevada after Storey County
legalized prostitution. When Las Vegas casino owners learned that
Conforte wanted to establish a brothel on the outskirts of Las
Vegas, they successfully lobbied Nevada lawmakers to pass emer-
gency legislation prohibiting brothel prostitution in counties with a
population of more than 200,000 people. 50 Rural counties, in con-
trast, rejoiced because brothels became a new source of revenue. 51
Today, Nevada hosts between twenty-five and thirty brothels,
located in ten of its seventeen counties. 52 Generally, residents sup-
port, accept, or ignore brothels; those few efforts made at closing
brothels have encountered sharp community criticism. 53
tution. See id. Lyon County legalized prostitution in March 1972. See Mustang
Ranch Chronology, supra note 37 (noting date of legalization of prostitution). In the
late 1970s, Churchill, Mineral, and Nye Counties also legalized prostitution. See id.
Lander and Esmeralda Counties followed. See id.
50. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 43-44 (describing reaction of casino owners
to ordinance legalizing prostitution). At the time of the proposal, that limit ap-
plied only to Las Vegas's Clark County. See id. at 44. Today, the population param-
eter has increased to 400,000. See id.
51. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 44 (noting opposite reaction to licensing of
brothels in rural counties).
52. See id. (stating number of brothels presently operating in Nevada). Specif-
ically, the brothels include: Chicken Ranch, Bunny Ranch, Bunny Ranch II, Kit
Kat, Sagebrush, Old Bridge, Wild Horse Canyon, Angel's Ladies Ranch, Cottontail
Ranch, Cherry Patch II, Shady Lady, Wild Kat Ranch, Cozy Corner, Pussy Cat Sa-
lon, Simone's de Paris, Villa Joy, My Place, Donna's Battle Mountain Ranch,
Mona's Ranch, Dovetail Ranch, Inez's, Mona Lisa Ranch, Sharon's Brothel and
Bar, Sue's Fantasy Club, and Bella's Mens Club. See http://www.nvbrothels.net/
newlndex.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); see also Prostitution in Nevada, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostitution inNevada (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (offer-
ing additional count of number of brothels in Nevada).
53. For a further discussion of Nevada's communities' acceptance of brothels,
see infra notes 62 and 64. Some critics argue that legal brothels tarnish Nevada's
image. See Prostitution in Nevada, supra note 52 (announcing concern that brothels
negatively impact Nevada's image). Steve Wynn, former owner of the Golden Nug-
get, Treasure Island, Mirage, and Belagio casinos, said brothels were a risk to the
tourism and gaming revenues; gaming revenues produced monthly taxable reve-
nues of $632 million in 1997. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 181 (referencing
Wynn's fear of brothels' impacts on gaming industry); see also CourtTV, Nevada
Brothels Still Going Strong Outside Major Cities, http://www.courttv.com/archive/peo-
ple/2001/0716/nevbrothels-ap.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (noting view of
brothels as beneficial members of community). The Angel's Ladies brothel hosts a
community-wide barbeque every year. See CourtTV, Nevada Brothels Still Going
Strong Outside Major Cities, supra. Also, the town of Crystal, Nevada can thank three
brothels for purchasing a new ambulance for the community. See id. When Ely
City Councilman Stuart Tracy attempted to shut down the town's only brothel, the
town voted him out of office. See id. Tracy attempted to have the Stardust Ranch
shut down as an immoral place. See id. Although residents rarely attended council
meetings, the meeting was full when Tracy proposed the closure. See id. The
council voted to close the brothel, but the mayor, himself a frequent customer of
the Stardust's bar, vetoed the bill. See id.
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2. Current Regulatory Structure of Legalized Brothels
Presently, control of the brothels remains at the county level,
where counties act as agents of the state. 54 Under Nevada law, any
county with a population of fewer than 400,000 people can license
brothels.55 County regulations require that brothels obtain a per-
mit and license to operate. 56 County commissioners possess sole
authority to grant and revoke licenses. 57 After receiving a permit
application, the sheriff and commissioners investigate: the appli-
cant, anyone associated with the brothel's management, the pro-
posed location, and other matters that are "necessary to the
protection of the public good, welfare and safety of the inhabitants
of the county. '58 After a complete and satisfactory investigation,
the sheriff presents a written report to the county commissioners. 59
54. For a further discussion of county-based regulation of brothels, see infra
notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
55. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.345 (2001) (permitting counties to license and
regulate brothels); see also supra note 50.
56. See STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39A, ch. 5.16.060, § 2 (1971); NYE
COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.030 (1988); LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDI-
NANCE 336.06 (1990) (establishing license and permit requirements for brothels);
see also STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39A, ch. 5.16.100, § 5(A) (1971) (stating
license requirement). For a list of information required to be submitted on the
permit, see, e.g., id. at 5.16.080.
57. See STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.070, §§ (A) & (B)
(1971); see also NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.050(2), 9.20.060
(1988) (describing conditions for permit issuance).
58. STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.090 (1971); see also NYE
COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.100 (1) (1988); LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDI-
NANCE 336.07 (B) (1990) (detailing investigation procedures). Brothels also pro-
vide employment opportunities. The Mustang Ranch was Storey County's third
largest employer with an annual payroll of $1.3 million and regularly employing
seventy five people. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 181-82 (observing brothel's im-
pact on local employment). At any one time, a brothel employs roughly three
hundred prostitutes. See Prostitution in Nevada, supra note 52 (asserting number of
prostitutes on payroll of brothel at any one time). Local and traveling suppliers
also benefit financially because they provide goods and services to brothels. See
ALBERT, supra note 12, at 209-10 (offering another positive economic impact of
brothels on communities). For example, prostitutes spend approximately
$350,000 annually on vendors' merchandise, like clothing. See id. Further, if a
customer arrives at a brothel by cab, the driver typically receives twenty percent of
whatever the customer spends. See Prostitution in Nevada, supra note 52. Some
brothel proponents also cite incidental financial impacts. See ALBERT, supra note
12, at 182 (noting decreased number of police officers needed in counties with
legalized brothels). For example, tourist services increase because of brothels. See
HELEN REYNOLDS, THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION 110 (Charles C. Thomas
1986). From that, a multiplier effect results whereby other businesses like gas sta-
tions, restaurants, bars, and retail stores also benefit. See id.
59. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.100 (2) (1988) (describ-
ing licensing process); see also LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.07 (C) (1990).
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The commissioners then meet with the applicant and determine
final license eligibility.60
Of course, permit fees also play a significant role in the ap-
proval process. Applicants in Storey County are required to submit
$9,000 with their application to cover investigative and first quarter
licensing fees. 6 1 Nye County requires a $1,000 permit fee. 62 Lyon
County demands a $2,000 application fee.63 Brothels must also pay
licensing fees which vary depending on the county. 64 Fees range
greatly; Storey County requires $25,000 per fiscal quarter while
60. SeeNYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.100 (3)(b) (1988) (noting
licensing eligibility); see also LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.07 (D) (1990).
61. See STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.160 (C) (1971) (signal-
ing license fees). Industry proponents argue that brothels bring money to finan-
cially depressed areas of Nevada and offer safe sex to lonely men. See CourtTV,
Nevada Brothels Still Going Strong Outside Major Cities, supra note 53 (stating argu-
ment in support of brothels). Brothel owners also want to contribute more money
to their communities. See Nevada Brothels Want to be Good Neighbor; Legal Businesses
Seek to Pay Taxes, May 10, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7805733 (describing
desire of brothel owners to contribute more to communities). Brothel owners des-
perately want the state of Nevada to tax their operations. See id. Owners hope that
the extra revenue "will endear them further to the public and give them more
political security." Id. Nevada politicians refused. See id. In particular, the gover-
nor considers it "a local government issue." Id. Additionally, the governor worries
that support of this type of legislation will be perceived as support of the entire
industry. See id. Other government officials are less concerned with perception.
In 2005, Assemblywoman Sheila Leslie, a prostitution opponent, proposed a tax of
two dollars per brothel customer. See id. Leslie expected the tax to bring the state
approximately $3.2 million over two years. See id.
62. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.230 (1) (1988) (indicating
permit fees). Nye County regulations also include a provision allowing the com-
missioners to charge additional investigative fees. See id. Some counties attribute
as much as twenty-five percent of their business fees to brothels. See Nevada Brothels
Want to be Good Neighbor; Legal Businesses Seek to Pay Taxes, supra note 61. Geoff
Arnold, President of the Nevada Brothel Association, asserts that many brothel
owners eagerly anticipate paying more in fees. See id. The Nevada's brothels gen-
erate anywhere between $20 million and $50 million per year. See id.
63. See LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.07 (A) (1990) (pointing out one
county's application fee).
64. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 45 (referring to schedule of license fees
based on number of customers one brothel serves). About 325,000 men visited the
Mustang Ranch's two brothels per year and this amounted to half of Nevada's
brothel business. See id. at 96. "In 1998 Nevada, local governments received over
$500,000 from brothel business licenses, liquor licenses, and work cards." Id. at
181. This was in addition to the revenue communities received from property
taxes, investigation fees tied to brothel applications, and licensing fees. See id.
That same year, "Storey County received $182,500 in revenue from its brothels,"
totaling almost four percent of the county's total general fund. Id. Also, Nye
County's licensing fees add approximately $168,000 to the county's ambulance
and health fund annually. See CourtTV, Nevada Brothels Still Going Strong Outside
Major Cities, supra note 53 (providing another example of civic contributions of
brothels). Gene Etchverry, Nye County's budget and fiscal director, credits the
brothels with helping the ambulance operation avoid "financial peril." See id.
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Lander County demands fifty dollars per quarter.65 In Lyon
County, commissioners base the license fee on the number of
rooms the brothel offers, with the highest fee set at $8,400 per
quarter. 66
Each prostitute must also undergo an investigation; they are
required to submit a photo, be fingerprinted, and have the proper
health status verifications. 67 Further, prostitutes must disclose any
prior arrests or convictions. 68 Finally, prostitutes must meet a mini-
mum age requirement, usually eighteen or twenty-one years old.69
Health regulations also command much of the commissioners'
attention. If any brothel owner knowingly exposes a patron to a
prostitute with a sexually transmitted disease, the owner risks li-
cense revocation.70 Further, owners must agree "to use all possible
care to prevent such occurrences and abide by any state and county
health regulations that may be imposed. ''71 Prostitutes must submit
to a medical exam at least once a week where the county tests them
for gonorrhea and Chlamydia. 72 Prostitutes must also undergo an
HIV/AIDS test once a month. 73 Lyon County further requires an-
nual screenings for Herpes Simplex 11.74 Additional health require-
ments mandate the cleanliness of facilities, appliances, and
65. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 45 (listing licensing fees for brothels in differ-
ent counties). Nye County charges a fifty dollar quarterly registration fee in addi-
tion to the licensing fee of one thousand dollars per quarter. See NYE COUNTY,
NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.230 (2), (3) (1988).
66. See LYON CouNTY, NEv., ORDINANCE 336.13 (B) (3) (1990) (indicating basis
of license fees). Brothels with twenty or fewer rooms pay $6,400 per quarter. See
id. Brothels with twenty-one to forty rooms pay $7,400 per quarter. See id. Broth-
els with forty-one or more rooms pay $8,400 per quarter. See id.
67. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.140 (1) (1988); see also
LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.14 (A) (1990) (describing brothel regulations
regarding prostitutes' employment criteria).
68. See, e.g., NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.140 (1) (f) (1988)
(noting regulatory and licensing scheme of brothels, particularly the prostitutes'
criminal history).
69. See, e.g., id. at ch. 9.20.140 (3)(c) (setting age requirement at twenty-one).
Lyon County regulations require a minimum age of eighteen. See LYON COUNTY,
NEV., ORDINANCE 336.16 (A) (8) (h) (1990).
70. See STOREY COuNrY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.180(A) (1971) (describ-
ing health regulations of Storey County designed to protect brothel patrons).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., STOREY COUNTY, NEv., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.180(B); see also NYE
COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.150(1)(a), (c) (1988). Prostitutes must
also be tested pre-employment for syphilis. See STOREY COUNrY, NEv., ORDINANCE
39, ch. 5.16.180(B)(4) (1971).
73. See STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.180(B) (4) (1971) (an-
nouncing additional protection for health of brothel patrons).
74. See LYON CouNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.15(B)(5) (1990) (naming addi-
tional disease for which county tests).
11
Hill: The Hunkiest Little Whorehouse in Town is Looking for a Few Good
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
88 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
personnel; demand that brothels provide clean sheets and towels
for each patron; dictate that the facility be cleaned daily; and re-
quire signs that necessitate the use of condoms. 75
Finally, the county commissioners determine the suitable
county locations in which to situate brothels.76 In Storey County,
unsuitable locations include: "the immediate vicinity of churches,
hospitals, schools, military [bases]," playgrounds, residential areas,
areas remote from police patrol, historic districts, and areas adja-
cent to hotels, motels, or casinos. 77 County control of the brothel
industry, therefore, reaches into nearly every aspect of brothel op-
erations, from issuing initial permits and licenses, to who can work,
how clean the facility has to be, and where to locate the building.
3. Brothels' Entertainment Aspect
"I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within [this] shorthand description;...
[b]ut I know it when I see it .... ,,78
Brothels are portrayed as escapes to paradise. Websites of vari-
ous Nevada brothels depict what appears to be an adult amusement
park or island retreat-like atmosphere at the brothels. For exam-
ple, brothels offer swimming pools, billiards tables, bars, spas, Jacuz-
zis, and volleyball courts - all outfitted with beautiful women
75. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch. 9.20.130(4)(a)-(h) (1988) (list-
ing more health standards county government places on brothels).
76. SeeSTOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.190 (1971). Nye County
brothels cannot operate within three hundred yards of any public street or any
other business establishment. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 129, ch.
9.20.130(1) (c), (e) (1988). One reason residents do not object to having brothels
in their communities is that legalized prostitution usually exists out of sight, tucked
away on the outskirts of town. See CourtTV, Nevada Brothels Still Going Strong Outside
Major Cities, supra note 53 (positing one reason why brothels are accepted neigh-
bors). Brothel patrons are rarely local residents, as they are more often truckers or
out-of-town businessmen in Nevada for conventions. See id. (suggesting types of
brothel customers). Moreover, brothel owners tend to avoid publicity and prefer
to maintain their operations out of the public eye. See id. Regulations determine
what type and size sign a brothel can display. See NYE COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE
129, ch. 9.20.130(3) (a); LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.08(B) (1990).
77. See STOREY COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 39, ch. 5.16.190(A)-(D) (1971).
Similarly, Lyon County regulations restrict brothels to outside the geographical
limits of any city or town in the county and not within three miles of a city or town
boundary. See LYON COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 336.08(A) (1)-(2) (1990). Further,
some county regulations call for a high fence with a gated entrance to prevent
access to the brothel unless opened from the inside. See id. at ORDINANCE
336.08(C).
78. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(quoting portion of famous statement about hard to define, abstract notions like
pornography).
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wearing skimpy bikinis.79 Additionally, research has shown that
brothel patrons see prostitutes as individuals willing "to fulfill some
sense of fantasy and adventure ... ."80 For example, convention-
goers often arrive in Las Vegas looking for a good time.81 Instead
of risking embarrassment or harassment by going to a sidewalk
prostitute, convention-goers often patronize brothels.82 Also, the
sexual activities that occur at brothels demonstrate that brothels
serve as places of entertainment.8 3
Moreover, Nevada state legislators consider brothels to be
places of entertainment.8 4 Although brothels are not presently sub-
ject to a statewide tax, a 2005 state proposal considered levying a
ten percent live entertainment tax on brothels. 85 Previously, the
state only imposed this tax on casinos, circuses, and nightclubs. 86
By adding brothels to this list, members of the Nevada legislature
have effectively categorized brothels as entertainment without hav-
ing to formally support the industry.8 7
79. See Resort and Spa at Sheri's Ranch, http://www.sherisranch.net (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2006) (listing activities offered at brothels); Wild Horse Adult Resort
and Spa, supra note 79; Angel's Ladies Brothel, http://www.angelsladiesbrothel.
corn (last visited Oct. 25, 2006); Wild Kat Ranch, http://www.wildkatranch.com
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
80. REYNOLDS, supra note 58, at 6 (citing patrons' views of prostitutes).
81. See id. (noting how customers choose brothels for fun versus sidewalk
prostitutes). Similarly, a study published in the Archives of Sexual Behavior ad-
dressed the reasons why men patronize strip clubs, which are similar to brothels in
many ways. See Katherine Frank, Exploring the Motivations and Fantasies of Strip Club
Customers in Relation to Legal Regulations, 34 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAv. 487, 487
(2005) (noting that strip clubs were "a very popular form of entertainment in the
United States"). Further, regular customers claimed that the strip clubs helped
them relax and offered both pleasure and excitement. See id. at 492. Strip clubs
also gave men an ego boost and created fantasies. See id. at 492-93. Also, men
considered being able to talk to a beautiful (and often nude) woman to be a lux-
ury. See id. at 492.
82. See REYNOLDS, supra note 58, at 6 (further discussing choice of brothel
over sidewalk prostitute).
83. For a further discussion on the entertainment aspects of brothels, see in-fta notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
84. For a further discussion on how Nevada legislators classify brothels as busi-
nesses, see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text and infra notes 85, 87 and
accompanying text.
85. See Sean Whaley, Bill to End Entertainment Tax Stays Alive, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.,
Apr. 15, 2005 (explaining levying of proposed entertainment tax on brothels).
86. See id. (listing forms of entertainment currently subject to entertainment
tax).
87. See id. Levying the live entertainment tax would be consistent with Gover-
nor Kenny Guinn's belief that a statewide tax on brothels would suggest some gov-
ernmental support of the brothel industry. See id. Ultimately, the proposal lost in
a four-to-three Senate committee vote. See Cy Ryan, Senate Panel Rejects Brothel Tax
Proposal, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/sto-
ries/stat-ase/2005/apr/ 15/518608922.html.
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Even portions of the media categorize brothel prostitution as
entertainment. For example, popular celebrity gossip website,
www.entertainment.iafrica.com, carried news of Fleiss's Stud Farm
plans.8 8 Further, The New York Times published a story of Fleiss's
Stud Farm in its Style section. 89 An online Google search of "broth-
els and entertainment" returns thousands of hits, most of which list
brothels as adult entertainment. 90 In particular, some blogs pur-
port to be "men's entertainment guide [s]," listing brothels among
other forms of entertainment.9 1
B. Heidi Fleiss
Nothing in Heidi Fleiss's family background suggests the direc-
tion in which her ambitions have steered her.92 She hails from a
wealthy family, as the daughter of a California pediatrician. 93 When
she was nineteen years old, Fleiss met Bernie Cornfeld, owner of a
88. See Heidi Fleiss to Open Male Brothel, Nov. 18, 2005, http://entertain-
ment.iafrica.com/news/578704.htm (describing entertainment website carrying
story on Fleiss's brothel).
89. See Navarro, supra note 8 (announcing newspaper placement of brothel
article in entertainment section).
90. See, e.g., Sexclusively Yours, SUN HERALD, Feb. 17, 2003, http://
www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/16/1045330464217.html (offering example of
categorizating brothels as adult entertainment).
91. See Men's Entertainment Guide, http://mulinux.dotsrc.org/archive/
8823.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (offering web log site listing brothels among
forms of entertainment).
92. According to Fleiss, her parents were "intellectual hippies." Vicky Allan,
Heidi Fleiss: Hollywood Madam, SUNDAY HERALD, June 29, 2003. The family camped
all around the United States, and the children attended a school based on the
principles of A.S. Neil. See id. One central theme of such a method of schooling
encourages natural childhood development that:
allow[s] for children to be in the classroom and engage in independent
activity that is not tied to any timetable. The principle of the timetable is
to allow the students to make informed choices within the context of a
structured day. This leads to a strong sense of personal agency and matur-
ity concerning life choices. The children know what is available and can
then decide how to personally use their own time.
Summerhill School, http://www.summerhillschool.co.uk/pages/about-summer
hill.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
93. See Hubler, supra note 2 (explaining Fleiss's family background); see also
Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2 (describing Fleiss's family background).
Ironically, a grand jury later indicted Dr. Paul Fleiss, Heidi Fleiss's father, for help-
ing her hide her madam business's profits. See Rotten.com, Biographies: Heidi
Fleiss, supra note 3 (remarking on irony of Fleiss's father being indicted also). Her
father later testified against her in exchange for a reduction of his money launder-
ing charges. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2. In the end, Dr. Fleiss re-
ceived one day in prison, a fine, three years of probation, and several hundred
hours of community service. See id.
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now defunct mutual fund sales company.94 Fleiss credits that rela-
tionship with giving her much of her business savvy.9 5
Three years later, Fleiss met well-known brothel owner, Mad-
ame Alex.9 6 Shortly thereafter, with Fleiss managing Madame
Alex's business, profits increased six-fold in the first month.97 After
parting ways with Madame Alex, Fleiss started her own call girl busi-
ness.98 Fleiss used her prominent connections to attract rich and
famous male clientele before matching them with carefully selected
women. 99
Fleiss's legal troubles began in June 1993 when she was ar-
rested in an undercover sting operation. 10 0 Initially, Fleiss faced
charges of pandering and selling cocaine.10 1 A federal grand jury
added charges of conspiracy, tax evasion, and money laundering. 10 2
Ultimately, Fleiss received a three-year prison sentence. 103 Pursu-
94. See Bernard Cornfeld, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bern-
hardCornfeld (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (listing career highlights of Fleiss's for-
mer boyfriend). Bernie Cornfeld formed a mutual fund sales company, Investors
Overseas Services (IOS), based in Geneva, Switzerland. See id. He hired thousands
of salespeople who targeted United States expatriates and servicemen trying to
avoid federal income taxes. See id. (noting company collected nearly $2.5 billion
over ten years). IOS launched a new fund comprised of investment in shares of
other IOS offerings. See id. The offerings were very popular in the strong market,
but when the market suffered a down-turn, dividends were paid out of IOS's capi-
tal. See id. IOS stock further decreased as the market continued its decline. See id.
95. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2 (crediting former lover with
beginning of Fleiss's business knowledge).
96. See id. (stating Fleiss's first contact with experienced madam).
97. See id. (detailing financial impact of Fleiss's business savvy on Madame
Alex's brothel business). Before Fleiss ran Madame Alex's organization, the busi-
ness grossed approximately $50,000 per month, but once Fleiss took over, business
increased to approximately $300,000 per month. See id. Fleiss explained the mis-
takes Madame Alex made: "She was using the same girls she'd used for years....
She needed a whole restructuring, revamping." Id.
98. See id. (announcing creation of Fleiss's call girl dynasty).
99. See id. (mentioning Fleiss's method of matchmaking). In addition, Fleiss
also would make all the financial and travel arrangements for the women and their
customers. See id. Fleiss then collected a forty percent fee for herself. See id.
100. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2 (stating beginning of legal trou-
bles Fleiss faced).
101. See Rotten.com, Biographies: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 3 (recounting
charges Fleiss faced).
102. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2; see also Rotten.com, Biogra-
phies: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 3 (announcing further charges levied by federal
grand jury).
103. See Rotten.com, Biographies: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 3 (mentioning
prison sentence, three hundred hours of community service and fine imposed on
Fleiss).
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ant to a plea bargain, Fleiss served a concurrent sentence of eigh-
teen months for state charges of attempted pandering. 10 4
In an effort to capitalize on her infamy as a madam, Fleiss en-
tertained the idea of opening a legitimate brothel in Nevada.' 0 5 At
first, a rising real estate market deterred Fleiss from purchasing an
existing brothel. 10 6 Instead, Fleiss considered constructing her own
facility on sixty acres of land she purchased near Pahrump, Nevada;
she ultimately dismissed this idea as well. 10 7 She then entered into
a deal with Joe Richards, an owner of three Nevada brothels. 08
The pair decided to remodel one of Richards' current brothels. 0 9
In the end, Richards backed out of the deal, leaving Fleiss to pro-
ceed with her plans alone." 0
From the start, the Stud Farm sent waves of apprehension
through the legalized prostitution community. George Flint, a lob-
byist for the Nevada Brothel Association, worried that because the
legalized brothel industry is not a firmly established fixture in Ne-
vada, negative publicity from Fleiss could cause industry-wide fall-
104. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2 (adding further charges levied
on Fleiss). She pled guilty to attempted pandering in 1997. See id. When asked
how she is currently earning an income, Fleiss responded "'I have my publishing.
I have my own radio show. I have a store on Hollywood Boulevard being opened
called The Hollywood Madam.'" Allan, supra note 92. Prior to conceiving her
plans for a Nevada brothel, Fleiss launched a clothing line, known as Heidi Wear,
wrote several books, and made numerous television appearances. See Then & Now:
Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2.
105. See Hubler, supra note 2 (noting Fleiss's initial plans to get back into
prostitution business as madam). After completion of her prison sentence in 1999,
Fleiss began capitalizing on her name. See Then & Now: Heidi Fleiss, supra note 2
(mentioning how Fleiss made her post-prison sentence money).
106. See Hubler, supra note 2 (tracing origin of Fleiss's plans to open brothel
in Nevada).
107. See id. (stating plans to build brothel rather than purchase already-ex-
isting one). Fleiss later determined that the land would be more profitable if used
for a housing development. See id. Heidi's Stud Farm will be located in Crystal,
Nevada. See Navarro, supra note 8.
108. See Hubler, supra note 2 (introducing Fleiss's business partner). Two key
reasons why Fleiss was interested in Joe Richards as a partner were: (1) "to prove
[Fleiss] would run a clean business" and (2) because Nevada state law permits
counties to refuse to issue licenses to convicted felons. See id. Further, Fleiss's
name will not be included on the license; she will serve more of a promotional
role. See id. (noting her potential title was 'hostess/madam').
109. See Hubler, supra note 2 (discussing more definite plans for Fleiss's
brothel). Fleiss and Richards intended to remodel the Cherry Patch, a bar and
collection of trailers Richards currently owns. See id. In her plans, Fleiss sees a
"more Hollywood look, with waterfalls and palm trees." Id. In addition, she envi-
sions a "pleasure palace" including "a marble-floored great room, a spa, a sex-toy
shop and secluded bungalows" where customers and studs can get better ac-
quainted. See Friess, supra note 3.
110. See Friess, supra note 3 (announcing Fleiss's partner abandoned pair's
plans).
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out."' Likewise, one main concern remains that the county
statutes regulating brothels refer to the workers as "she;" making
those statutes applicable to brothels with male prostitutes would re-
quire rewording of the laws. 11 2 In short, "'[s]he may bring enough
publicity to cause a problem for the industry.'"1 13
If Heidi Fleiss faces any resistance from Nevada lawmakers, she
awaits battle." 4 For those lawmakers who attempt to maneuver
Fleiss out of Nevada, she plans to challenge the opposition on the
grounds that Nevada laws discriminate against homosexual men." 5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUD FARM
A. Protected Class v. Not Protected Class
1. Homosexuals Are a Protected Class If Homosexual Acts Are Protected
Conduct
Should anyone mount a legal battle against Fleiss's policy
prohibiting male-to-male services at her Stud Farm, the debate will
center on whether homosexuals are eligible for protected class sta-
tus. Fleiss's opponents who argue that the policy discriminates
against homosexuals can find support using various aspects of soci-
ety.116 After all, homosexuals are consistently treated differently in
both the social and legal arenas. 117
111. See id. (indicating brothel association lobbyist's concern about negative
implications of Stud Farm). The Nevada Brothel Association represents some of
the state's legal brothels. See id. Flint explained: "'Our industry is not so firm...
that we need to flirt with some secondary activity that could bring down the whole
house of cards.'" Id.
112. See id. (depicting one area of concern for other brothel owners). In ad-
dition, Nevada counties' brothel laws also require prostitutes to undergo cervical
sexually transmitted disease tests. See id. Brothel regulations and laws would re-
quire updating. See id. For a further discussion of various Nevada county statutes
regulating legal brothels, see supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
113. Id. (quoting warning of Richard Ziser, president of group known as Ne-
vada Concerned Citizens).
114. See id. (noting Fleiss's willingness to engage in legal fight if necessary).
115. See Friess, supra note 3 (showing Fleiss's grounds for legal challenge if
faced with hurdles from Nevada lawmakers). "'What's good for the goose should
be good for the gander."' Id. (quoting Fleiss on potential problems she may face
from lawmakers).
116. See Shawn M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or Further Discrimina-
tion? Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After
Tanner v. Ohsu, 3J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L., 269, 272-73 (1999) (asserting idea
that in society, homosexuals receive different treatment than heterosexuals).
117. See id. (positing differential treatment homosexuals receive as result of
their sexual orientation). For example, many states still have statutes criminalizing
sexual intimacy in a same-sex relationship. See id. Law enforcement and the legis-
lature rarely enforce these statutes. See id. at 273. "[T] here is a pattern of nonen-
forcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private." Lawrence v. Texas,
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In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to en-
gage in sodomy. 118 The Bowers decision suffered a significant blow
in 1996 with Romer v. Evans.'1 9 In Romer, the Supreme Court invali-
dated an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited
any locality or state government from offering special protections to
people on the basis of sexual orientation. 120 Bowers received a final
blow in the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision. 121 In Lawrence, the Su-
preme Court held a Texas statute unconstitutional because it
criminalized certain sexual conduct between two consenting same-
sex adults. 122
Although the Romer decision does not expressly establish
homosexuals as a protected class, the opinion does suggest that
homosexuals cannot receive lesser protections than those inherent
in our free society. 123 Specifically, the decision invalidated the re-
moval of legal protections based on a person's homosexuality.' 24
The Supreme Court explained that the amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution "imposes a special disability" solely on homosexu-
als. 125 Further, the amendment prohibited homosexuals from
enjoying the same safeguards that other citizens enjoy without con-
539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (stating that thirteen states prohibit sodomy and four
states enforce those laws against homosexual conduct only). One author claims
that by criminalizing homosexual sex, the laws act as a foundation for the denial of
equal treatment of homosexuals. See Filippi, supra note 116, at 273 (describing
effects of crminalizing certain behavior).
118. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (giving holding of
case). In Bowers, a police officer legally entered Hardwick's home and saw Hard-
wick engaging in intimate sexual activity with another consenting adult male. See
id. at 187-88. He was charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized
sodomy. See id. Although Hardwick avoided prosecution, he brought an action in
federal court challenging the statute. See id. at 188. He claimed that the statute
violated the United States' Constitution. See id.
119. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (weakening Bowers decision
by strengthening protection for homosexuals); see also Filippi, supra note 116, at
274 (mentioning Bowers decision mischaracterized homosexuality as sodomy).
120. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 (providing Court's decision).
121. 539 U.S. at 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct when it was de-
cided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bow-
ers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
122. See id. (asserting state statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct are un-
constitutional). "[Bowers 's] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homo-
sexual persons." Id. at 575.
123. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (establishing that homosexuals have earned
protected class status by inference).
124. See id. at 635 (identifying that laws must have rational relationship to
legitimate government purpose).
125. See id. at 631 (relaying how proposed amendment saddles homosexuals
with additional burden).
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straint. 12 6 The Court held that the amendment withdrew from
homosexuals the protections against discrimination that are inte-
gral to a free society.127 The Court concluded, however, that the
classification of homosexuals as a group worthy of less protection
was a classification for its own sake, and one the United States Con-
stitution did not permit.128 Therefore, arguably, the Supreme
Court has moved toward recognizing homosexuals as a protected
class by not denying them basic societal and legal protections. 129
Lawrence came on the heels of the Romer decision and can be
interpreted as establishing homosexuals as a protected class. 130 Al-
though earlier cases indicate that homosexuals are not a protected
class, the Lawrence analysis took a different approach, albeit one
that is complementary to the Romer decision. 31 Lawrence focused
on the conduct, namely intimate homosexual acts, rather than the
individuals' status. 132 The Court explained: "When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the con-
duct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more en-
during. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice."'133 The Court
reasoned that intimate, personal choices, like those related to sex-
ual intimacy, are central to an individual's dignity, autonomy, and
liberty.'34 The Court acknowledged that the Texas statute sought
126. See id. (stating Court's conclusion that amendment deprived homosexu-
als of safeguards).
127. See id. ("These are protections taken for granted by most people either
because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that con-
stitute ordinary civic life in a free society.").
128. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (announcing invalidity of classification of
homosexuals as less protected).
129. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's possible move toward
characterizing homosexuals as a protected class, see supra notes 119-28 and accom-
panying text.
130. For a further discussion of Romer, see supra notes 119-20, 123-28 and ac-
companying text.
131. For a further discussion of the progression in the Supreme Court's view
of homosexuals as a protected class, compare supra notes 119-28 and accompany-
ing text with infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
132. For a further discussion of the consideration of homosexual conduct
rather than status, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-70 (2003) (demon-
strating case where Court focused on conduct rather than status of party).
133. Id. at 567.
134. See id. at 573-74 (referencing decisions in other countries and domestic
decisions that hold that choice of engaging in homosexual acts is one of choices
that is central to personal liberty).
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to control a personal relationship that lies within the liberty of an
individual to choose, without fear of being punished. 135
Therefore, the Supreme Court appears correct in viewing the
issue as one of conduct rather than sexual orientation. If the con-
duct is not criminal, then the characteristic that prompts such con-
duct cannot be criminal. Further, a history of unequal treatment,
violence, and discrimination suggests that homosexuals as a group
are worthy of protected class status.-1 3 6 Therefore, homosexuals as a
protected class deserve equal protection and treatment, and cannot
be discriminated against at will.
2. No Court Has Established That Homosexuals Are a Protected Class,
So No Special Treatment Should Exist
Although courts have addressed discrimination against homo-
sexuals, no court has expressly held that homosexuals warrant pro-
tected class status. 13 7 Instead, courts have invalidated state statutes
criminalizing homosexual conduct and state constitutional amend-
ments that prevent privileged status to homosexuals.1 38 If Fleiss
hopes to maintain her policy prohibiting male-to-male sexual activi-
ties at her Stud Farm, she must argue against cases like Lawrence
and Romer that appear to establish a level of protection for
homosexuals. 1 39
First, to counter, Fleiss can cite Padula v. Webster.140 In Padula,
the court listed several criteria for identifying a suspect class: (1)
one that is "saddled with ... disabilities;" (2) subject to "a history of
purposeful unequal treatment;" (3) in a "position of political
powerlessness;" and (4) in possession of an immutable characteris-
tic. 1 41 Based on these criteria, the Padula court held that homosex-
135. See id. at 567 (characterizing Court's interpretation of statute's aim).
136. See, e.g., Filippi, supra note 116, at 272-82 (positing disparate treatment of
homosexuals).
137. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (observing that Court invalidated stat-
ute that criminalized homosexual conduct but stopped short of affording homo-
sexuals protected class status).
138. See id. (overturning state ban on sodomy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
635 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional amendment). For a further discus-
sion of these cases, see supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
139. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (naming two modern
Supreme Court cases that could help defeat Fleiss's ban on male-to-male services at
her brothel).
140. See 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that rejected homosex-
ual FBI special agent applicant was not subject to equal protection violation be-
cause homosexuality is not suspect class).
141. See id. at 102 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). The Su-
preme Court has only recognized three suspect classes: race, alienage, and na-
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uals were not a protected class and thus could suffer rationally
justified discrimination. 14 2
Second, Fleiss can support her argument using Woodward v.
United States, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit held that homosexuals are not a protected class.' 43 The
court explained that homosexuality as a trait differs from traits of
any of the recognized suspect classes. 144 Recognized suspect classes
possess immutable characteristics, but homosexuality is distin-
guished as mainly "behavioral in nature."1 45 Further, the conduct
of those in a suspect or protected class bears no relevance to the
identification of that group as protected.1 46
Third, in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit intentionally departed from the dis-
trict court's finding that homosexuals were a protected class. 147
Although the circuit court recognized that homosexuals have suf-
fered a history of discrimination, it noted that today, such discrimi-
nation occurs to a lesser degree.' 48  Moreover, the court
determined that homosexuals possess growing political power. 149
tional origin. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). A suspect class is a class of people grouped
according to specific classifications based on race, national origin, or alienage;
these classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause
analysis. See BLACK'S LAW DIC-rIONARY 1460 (7th ed. 1999). "Protected class" can
be used interchangeably with "suspect class." See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 n.1 (2000) (indicating case where sexual orientation was
listed as protected status in New Jersey statute, and where other protected classes
listed mirror suspect classes).
142. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (holding homosexuals are not protected
class). The court agreed with the FBI that during counterintelligence activities,
homosexuals risk the threat of possible blackmail to protect their partners or
themselves. See id. at 104. Therefore, the FBI could rationally justify considering
job applicants' sexuality. See id.
143. See 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that homosexuals are
not protected class worthy of higher level of scrutiny).
144. See id. (announcing lack of traits that define suspect classes).
145. Id.
146. See id. (arguing irrelevance of conduct of group in determining status as
protected class).
147. See 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that rational basis review,
rather than heightened strict scrutiny, was applicable to evaluate regulation be-
cause homosexuals are not protected class).
148. See id. at 465 (reporting court's belief that homosexuals face less discrim-
ination today than in past).
149. See id. at 466 (suggesting that homosexuals have more political power
today). "It cannot be said 'they have no ability to attract the attention of
lawmakers."' Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
445 (1985)).
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The three cases demonstrate that courts have unabashedly
held that homosexuals are not a protected class. Fleiss can solidly
base her argument on these holdings. 150 Fleiss can also combine
the requirements for a protected class set out in Padula, along with
the reasoning in Ben-Shalom, as further support for her claim that
homosexuals, as a group, are not a protected class. 15 1 In particular,
Fleiss can cite the Ben-Shalom court's finding that homosexuals suf-
fer less discrimination today than in the past.152 Additionally, Fleiss
can rely on Ben-Shalom's determination that homosexuals possess in-
creased political power.1 53 She may refer to homosexual Nevada
Assemblyman David Parks, an openly gay Nevada legislator who
publically questioned the Stud Farm's policy, as an example. 5 4
Overall, courts have established the well-recognized position that
homosexuals are not a protected class. 155
Fourth, the court in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office also maintained that homosexuals are not a suspect
or protected class. 156 In evaluating the requirements set forth in
Padula, the court in High Tech Gays observed that homosexuals have
suffered a history of discrimination; homosexuals as a class have not
satisfied the other requirements. 57 Homosexuality, according to
the court, is not an immutable characteristic, but is instead a behav-
150. For a further discussion of court opinions that homosexuals are not a
protected class, see supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text and infra notes 156-
59 and accompanying text.
151. For a list of requirements for protected class status, see supra note 141
and accompanying text.
152. For a further discussion of decreased discrimination faced by homosexu-
als today, see supra note 148 and accompanying text and infra note 157 and accom-
panying text (touching on amount of discrimination toward homosexuals today
and in past).
153. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 n.9 (noting that Time magazine reported
that at least one congressman is openly gay and at least five other top officials are
known to be gay).
154. For a further discussion about the homosexual Nevada legislator, see
supra note 9.
155. For a further discussion of case law establishing that homosexuals do not
warrant protected class status, see supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text and
infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
156. See 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that rejecting homosexual
applicants for secret clearances did not violate constitution because homosexuals
are not protected class and therefore not entitled to heightened scrutiny).
157. See id. at 573 (finding that homosexuals lack other characteristics needed
for protected class status). For a further discussion on characteristics of a pro-
tected class and the current state of discrimination against homosexuals, see supra
notes 141 and 152 and accompanying text.
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ior.' 58 Further, according to the court, homosexuals are not with-
out political clout. 159
Legislatures address discrimination against homosexuals by
passing anti-discrimination laws.160 From this, Fleiss can argue that
if discrimination of homosexuals was of such a great concern, con-
sidering the political power the High Tech Gays court held homosex-
uals possess, the Nevada legislature would have already passed anti-
discrimination legislation. 161 Further, Fleiss can argue that homo-
sexuals who feel her policy discriminates against them should in-
stead use their political power to urge the Nevada legislature to pass
anti-discrimination statutes. 162
Finally, even after Romer, at least one court has held that homo-
sexuals are not a protected class. In Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a city charter amendment that
barred city government from enacting any regulation that would
provide homosexuals with a claim for protected status, quota pref-
erence, or other preferential treatment.163 The court carefully clar-
ified that Romer did not stand to forbid citizens from authorizing
their local governments to withhold special rights or protections
from homosexuals. 64 Instead, citizens can choose to remove pro-
tections from a group not constitutionally entitled to any special
legal status. 165 Fleiss can use this rationale to argue that the right to
award or remove special protections against discrimination based
on homosexuality rests with the people. Therefore, if Nevada's citi-
158. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (explaining how homosexuals fail to
meet criteria of suspect class because as behavior and not trait, homosexuality is
fundamentally different from traits like race or alienage).
159. See id. at 574 (announcing homosexuals possess "political power"). For a
further discussion on homosexuals' increasing political power, see supra notes 149
and 153 and accompanying text.
160. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (asserting there is no merit to argu-
ment that homosexuals are protected class because they lack political power).
161. For an example of an anti-discrimination statute, see, e.g., infra note 186.
162. For a further discussion of the political power available to homosexuals
in Nevada, see, e.g., supra notes 149, 153, 159 and accompanying text.
163. See 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Cincinnati charter
amendment survived rational basis review).
164. See id. at 298-301 (distinguishing Romer opinion). The court explained
that "[s]uch a reading would disenfranchise the voters of their most fundamental
right... to vote to override or preempt any policy or practice implemented.., to
bestow special rights, protections, and/or privileges upon a group of people who
do not comprise a suspect ... class .... Id. at 298.
165. See id. (stating that Romer does not forbid citizens from withholding pro-
tections from homosexuals). Because homosexuals are not a protected class, they
are not "constitutionally entitled to any special favorable legal status." Id.
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zens are interested in protecting homosexuals' access to the Stud
Farm's services, they could petition their state and local govern-
ments for a regulatory solution. 166 Moreover, Fleiss can argue that
the lack of any such petitions to protect homosexuals from discrimi-
nation indicates a general acquiescence to her policy of no male-to-
male services.
B. Public Accommodation Requirement vs. Private
Club Exemption
1. Public Accommodation: How Homosexuals Can Challenge the Stud
Farm's Policy and Establish a Brothel as a Place of Public
Accommodation
Nevada's legal brothels offer their services to the public.' 67 In
doing so, a brothel presents itself as a place of public accommoda-
tion.' 68 Therefore, homosexuals planning to challenge the Stud
Farm's discriminatory policy may instead claim the brothel as a
place of entertainment. 169 This creates a possible challenge under
the public accommodation provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Act") and related state statutes. 170
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that people shall be enti-
tled to enjoy goods, services, and accommodations without discrimi-
nation premised on a series of distinguishing characteristics. 171
The public accommodation requirement has prompted much con-
stitutional rights litigation.1 72 In Daniel v. Paul, the Supreme Court
stressed that the Act aimed "'to remove the daily affront and humil-
166. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinatti, 128
F.3d 289, 298 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting electorate's ability to instruct their municipal
officers through voting).
167. See, e.g., Shady Lady Ranch, http://www.shadyladyranch.com/main.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (showing brothel services marketed to public).
168. For a further discussion of brothels as places of public accommodation,
see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (positing that brothels may be places
of public accommodation).
169. For a further discussion of brothels as places of entertainment, see infra
notes 188-212 and accompanying text (proposing that policy proponents may want
to argue brothels are places of entertainment and therefore qualify as places of
public accommodation).
170. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964) ("All persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation. ).
171. See id. (indicating goal of Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Act")).
172. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301-08 (1969) (introducing public
accommodation as point of constitutional debate).
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iation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities osten-
sibly open to the general public.""173
In an effort to "eliminate the unfairness, humiliation, and in-
sult" of discrimination in establishments, the public accommoda-
tion requirement prohibits discrimination in places that serve the
public and affect interstate commerce. 174 Those places include any
inn or other establishment that provides lodging, any restaurant,
and any theater or other place of entertainment. 175
Additionally, an establishment must affect interstate commerce
to qualify as a public accommodation. 176 The Act states that an es-
tablishment affects interstate commerce if it serves interstate trav-
elers or if a substantial portion of its goods move in interstate
commerce.177 Also, if the establishment customarily shows films,
exhibitions, or other entertainment performances that move in
commerce, then the establishment satisfies the requirement. 178
In Daniel, the Supreme Court held that when a facility adver-
tised in a local hotel magazine, a newspaper, and on the radio, the
establishment sought "broad-based patronage from an audience
173. Id. at 307-08 (quoting purpose of public accommodation requirement of
Act). Furthermore, other courts have proclaimed that the purpose was to "remove
discrimination in places of public accommodation . . . with respect to all of the
services rendered and operated within its physical confines .... " Pinkey v. Meloy,
241 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
174. See Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 67 (5th
Cir. 1975) (quoting goal of public accommodations requirement of Act); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (noting Act's non-exhaustive list of examples of places of public
accommodation). With the requirement that either the public accommodation
itself, or one of its incidental effects impacts interstate commerce, the court in
United States v. Allen distinguished that "a 'place of exhibition or entertainment'
,moves in commerce' if it 'customarily presents films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment."' 341 F.3d 870, 877 (9th
Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(3)). For a further discussion on the im-
pact of interstate commerce, see infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (designating what Act deems place of public ac-
commodation). Reasoning behind this provision dates back to nineteenth century
English jurisprudence:
[t]he innkeeper is not to select his guests[;] [h]e has no right to say to
one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every
one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be
received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
571 (1995) (quoting Rex v. Ivens, (1835) 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N.P.)).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (offering additional requirement for establishment
to come under coverage of Act).
177. See id. (defining requirement for affecting interstate commerce).
178. See id. (announcing other ways facility operates that affects interstate
commerce). For a complete definition of "affecting commerce," see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(c) (1964).
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which they knew to include interstate travelers."1 79 Moreover, the
Court explained that the facility certainly served out of state trav-
elers, and consequently, it would be unrealistic to think that not
one of the customers was an interstate traveler.1 8 0
Similar to the advertising efforts in Daniel, with the vast reach
of the Internet, Nevada brothels participate in national and interna-
tional marketing efforts.' 8 ' Additionally, Nevada is the only state
that offers legalized prostitution, and it would be unrealistic to
think that notoriety itself does not serve as a form of advertising.' 8 2
Further, Nevada has passed a statute to protect the enjoyment
of places of public accommodation.1 83 The Nevada statute parallels
the Act in that the statute defines a place of public accommodation
as any establishment that provides lodging, any facility serving food
or liquor, any place of public gathering, any service establishment,
or any place of recreation.1 8 4 In addition, the state statute's impact
also mirrors that of the Act.18 5 The statute demands that all people
are entitled to the enjoyment of services, facilities, and accommoda-
tions of any public place without discrimination. a86
To date, no court has directly addressed whether a brothel is a
place of public accommodation under the Act. Nevertheless, a re-
view of applicable case law helps to guide a determination of
whether a brothel qualifies as a place of public accommodation. If
179. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 304 (1969) (holding that advertising to in-
terstate travelers proved facility was operating in interstate commerce and was pub-
lic accommodation). In Daniel, the Court stated that a snack bar in a privately
owned recreation facility, that served food to interstate travelers, and whose food
moved through interstate commerce, was a public accommodation. See id. at 304.
180. See id. (remarking substantial amount of food was moved in interstate
commerce served to interstate travelers).
181. See, e.g., Resort and Spa at Sheri's Ranch, supra note 79. Many brothels
have their own websites depicting services offered, amenities, prices, directions,
and the women available. See id. Further, web blogs and message boards that ad-
vertise the brothels are also available on the web. See, e.g., Nevada Brothel Times,
Legal Prostitution in Nevada, http://www.nevadabrotheltimes.com/phpBB2/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2006).
182. See Society for Human Sexuality, Nevada Legal Prostitution FAQ http://
www.sexuality.org/l/workers/nevada.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (noting Ne-
vada is only state to legalize prostitution).
183. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 651.050 (1965) (introducing state statute aimed at
removing discrimination in public places).
184. See id. at § 651.050 (2)(a), (b), (e), (g), (j) (defining place of public
accommodation according to Nevada statute).
185. See id. (demonstrating Nevada statute mirrors federal Act).
186. See id. (showing state statute is very similar to federal Act). The Nevada
statute protects against discrimination based on "race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, or disability." Id. at § 651.070. The statute does not mention protection
against discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id.
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a brothel qualifies as a place of entertainment, the brothel is a place
of public accommodation by default.187
First, federal courts have explained that the word "entertain-
ment" carries only its ordinary meaning. 188 Therefore, a place of
entertainment "'includes both establishments which present shows,
performances and exhibitions to a passive audience and those es-
tablishments which provide... other activities for the amusement
or enjoyment of its patrons.' 189 In United States v. Johnson Lake, for
example, the court suggested that because spectators went to watch
people play sports and enjoy themselves, the facility provided a
"'performance for the amusement or interest of a viewing public'
and ... therefore, [constituted] a 'place of entertainment' . . .. 190
The court elaborated saying that because many patrons came to the
complex "to be entertained by watching others participate in the
activities available," Johnson Lake was a place of entertainment.1 9'
Surprisingly, brothels offer entertainment services beyond sex-
ual relations. 192 For example, Sheri's Ranch, a brothel in Pahrump,
Nevada, offers its customers billiards, swimming, and volleyball.1 93
Also, customers can observe women dancing. 194 Many of the activi-
ties offered at numerous brothels are the same as, or similar to,
those offered at Johnson Lake; the activities offered by both John-
son Lake and numerous brothels entertain spectators and partici-
pants.1 95 Moreover, at the Wild Horse Adult Resort and Spa,
customers can relax and watch women "strut their stuff," in addi-
187. For a further discussion of whether a brothel qualifies for public accom-
modation, see infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1380
(S.D. Ala. 1970) (assigning ordinary meaning to term "entertainment" in Act).
189. Id. (quoting Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350-51
(5th Cir. 1968)(en banc)) (positing that place of entertainment should be read
broadly).
190. Id. (quoting Miller, 394 F.2d at 348). In Johnson Lake, the court held a
recreational complex that included a swimming pool, picnic area, dancing area,
snack bar, pool tables, and arcade games was a place of entertainment. See id. at
1378, 1380.
191. See id. at 1380 (discussing how recreational facility that allows customers
to watch other people participate in activities qualifies as place of entertainment).
192. For a further discussion of brothels' other entertainment features, see
infra notes 194, 196, 207, 209-10 and accompanying text.
193. See Resort and Spa at Sheri's Ranch, supra note 79 (illustrating additional
entertainment services provided at brothel).
194. See id. (telling other entertainment features brothel makes available to
patrons). Such dances are similar to those found in strip clubs. See id.
195. For a further discussion of Johnson Lake and how the court held that
establishment to be a place of entertainment, see supra notes 190-91 and accompa-
nying text.
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tion to enjoying the room service, the Jacuzzi, or the swimming
pool. 196
Second, the Act explicitly declines to create an exhaustive list
of places of public accommodation. 197 'Congress expressly noted
that any "other place of exhibition or entertainment" qualifies as a
place of public accommodation, presuming that the place affects
interstate commerce. 198 Additionally, one court held that prostitu-
tion implicates more than simply private sexual relations between
individuals. 99 Specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that
prostitution affects the surrounding community.200 In support of
this proposition, the court stated that "[t]he brothel .. .is much
closer to [a] public accommodation setting . . . " than a private
bedroom. 201
Most Congressional discussion surrounding the reach of the
public accommodation requirement has focused on places of spec-
tator entertainment. The Supreme Court, however, carefully noted
that it "'does not follow that the scope of [the Act] should be re-
stricted to the primary objects of Congress's concern when a natu-
ral reading of its text would call for broader coverage.' " 202 In Miller
196. See Wild Horse Adult Resort and Spa, supra note 79 (describing variety of
entertainment options offered to brothel customers).
197. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964) (highlighting
provision in Act designed to counter reading list of places of public accommoda-
tion as exclusive of other places).
198. See id. (pinpointing non-exclusive language for what constitutes place of
public accommodation).
199. See State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Iowa 1976) (explaining that
prostitution's effects impact more than just those individuals involved). In Price,
the court held that a defendant charged under a statute criminalizing prostitution
had no standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 816-
18.
200. See id. at 818 (positing that prostitution touches surrounding commu-
nity). Most importantly, the negotiations between the prostitutes and the custom-
ers are usually done in public. See id.
201. Id. (maintaining that brothel resembles public accommodation). The
court explained that a brothel, like the adult theaters in Paris Theater I v. Slanton, is
a better example of a public accommodation than an area of seclusion and privacy.
See id. (citing 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973)). In Paris Adult Theater I, the Supreme Court
held that the state of Georgia had a legitimate state interest in regulating the exhi-
bition of obscene material in places of public accommodation like adult theaters.
413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (stating holding of case). For a further discussion of bur-
lesque houses as public accommodations, see Knoob Enterprises, Inc. v. Village of
Colp, 832 N.E.2d 887, 894-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); City of Chicago v. Severini, 414
N.E.2d 67, 69-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 865 S.W.2d
332, 335 (Ky. 1993). For a further discussion of nude bath spas as places of public
accommodation, see People v. Business or Businesses Located at 2896 West 64th
Avenue, 989 P.2d 235, 237-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
202. United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 878 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Daniel
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307 (1969)) (suggesting broader reading of place of en-
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v. Amusement Enterprises, the Fifth Circuit broadly construed the
Act.20 3 In particular, the court stated that the public accommoda-
tions listed in the Act do not have to be places of entertainment
that present exhibitions for people to observe. 20 4 Although the
types of establishments listed by the Act are the most common, the
list is not exhaustive.20 5 The Miller court held that "any establish-
ment which presents a performance for the amusement or interest
of a viewing public would be included" as a place of public
accommodation. 206
Similarly, a brothel offers patrons the opportunity to observe
women in a social environment, rather than solely on an intimate
basis. 207 In Miller, the court's expanded definition of a place of en-
tertainment included both facilities that presented performances
for spectators, as well as those that offered recreational or other
activities for customers. 20 8 Similarly, brothels offer activities that al-
low customers to passively enjoy themselves.20 9 Further, brothels of-
tertainment as form of public accommodation). In Allen, a local park qualified as
a place of public accommodation so that defendants were properly convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibits two or more people from conspiring to
injure or otherwise oppress anyone exercising any Constitutional right. See id. at
870, 876.
203. See 394 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1968) (remarking that Fifth Circuit will
not follow decisions of courts that prefer or demand narrow construction of Act).
In its reasoning, the court established that it read the Act's provision on places of
entertainment not "with narrowed eye but with open minds attuned to the clear
and strong purpose of the Act .... That [the provision] is to be liberally construed
and broadly read we find to be well established." Id. at 349.
204. See id. at 348 (suggesting broader interpretation of provision of Act that
deals with places of entertainment). The court added that it declined to demand
that the types of establishments named in the Act must be exhibitions that move in
interstate commerce. See id.
205. See id. (stating that list of establishments that qualify as places of en-
tertainment is neither complete, nor exhaustive).
206. Id. The court attributed this determination to consideration of the Act
as well as legislative history. See id. From that, the court concluded that the gen-
eral intent of the Act was to end discrimination in facilities open to the public. See
id. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit elaborated, saying "we as Judges may take judicial
knowledge of the common ordinary fact that human beings are 'people watchers'
and derive much enjoyment from this pastime." Id. at 349.
207. See Wild Horse Adult Resort and Spa, supra note 79 (describing one as-
pect of brothel patronage as observing women); see also Resort and Spa at Sheri's
Ranch, supra note 79 (announcing that brothel also offers sports bar and other
relaxing areas where customers can "enjoy cocktails or partake in an exciting game
of pool with your friends or any of our Ladies").
208. See Miller, 394 F.2d at 350 (exploring expanded definition of place of
entertainment established by court).
209. For a further discussion on brothels as places of entertainment, see supra
notes 187-208 and infra notes 210-11.
29
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fer participatory activities that entertain customers. 210 Therefore,
brothels arguably fall within the broad definition of a place of en-
tertainment covered by the Act.2 11 As a result of the Nevada state
statute mirroring the Act, brothels also fall within the protection
provided by that legislation, as well. 2 12
2. Private Club Exemption: How Heidi Reiss Can Defend Her Stud
Farm's Policy by Forming a Private Club
Should Heidi Fleiss face a discrimination challenge on the
ground that her Stud Farm policy prohibits male-to-male services,
Fleiss may have a defense rooted in the Act. She may be able to
establish the Stud Farm as a private club, rather than as a public
accommodation, thereby escaping anti-discrimination laws. 213 The
Act provides that its provisions "shall not apply to a private club or
other establishment not in fact open to the public ..... 214 This
exemption has caused numerous individuals and entities to trans-
form their establishments into private clubs.215 A review of the leg-
islative history of the Act shows that the legislators anticipated the
possibility the exemption would be abused.216 Moreover, courts
have embraced the concerns expressed in the legislative history.
The court found language from United States v. Clarksdale, King &
Anderson Co., particularly helpful: "it is clear that the only clubs
which meet the 'factual' test of the statute are those whose 'mem-
bership is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis.' Specifi-
210. For a further discussion on brothels' participatory and nonparticipatory
actitivies, see supra notes 187-209.
211. For a further discussion supporting the conclusion that brothels are
places of entertainment, see supra notes 187-210 and accompanying text.
212. For a further discussion suggesting that the Nevada State statute and the
Act are similar, see supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
213. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964) (referring to
Act's private club exemption provision).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1968)
(mentioning example of restaurant that attempted to become private club to avoid
application of Act). The court noted that "[an establishment] cannot, by drafting
itself a set of by-laws, become an exempt club." Id. at 527.
216. See id. at 528 (offering legislative history of Act's private club exemp-
tion). "'If a club were established as a way of by-passing or avoiding the effect of
the law, and it was not really a club.., that kind of a club would come under the
language of the bill."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 88-110, at 6008 (1964)). Further,
there is "'[n]o doubt attempts at subterfuge or camouflage may be made to give a
place of public accommodation the appearance of a private organization .... .'" Id.
(quoting S. REP. No. 88-110, at 7407 (1964)).
[Vol. 14: p. 77
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol14/iss1/3
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FLEISS'S BROTHEL 107
cally precluded from this exemption are 'sham establishments'
"217
Consequently, case law has created guidelines for determining
if an establishment is a legitimate private club or one created specif-
ically to evade anti-discrimination laws.218 Only a club created and
operated as a private club qualifies for the private club exemp-
tion.219 Because establishments vary, the court must first make a
factual inquiry.220 Courts must examine characteristics of the al-
leged private club to determine if it meets the requirements for the
private club exemption. 221
217. Id. (quoting United States v. Clarksdale, King & Anderson Co., 288 F.
Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Miss. 1965)); see also United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp.
370, 371-74 (E.D. La. 1969). Restaurant owners closed their restaurant and imme-
diately reopened it as a private dining club. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 371-74. The
owners intended to exclude blacks from the establishment under the guise of the
private club exemption. See id. The court explained:
The formation of this "club" was far from a mere isolated instance of
discrimination. Rather, it was the calculated expression of a continuing
and persuasive policy of the owners and those white persons who became
members of the "club" to deter and discourage the use of the restaurant
by [blacks]. It was far more effective, and in some respects more harmful,
than the denial of service to [blacks] in a number of isolated instances.
Although it was not in itself an immediate and direct denial of service,
the creation of the "club" was of broader scope, designed to curtail at the
very inception any possible attempt by [blacks] to enjoy the facilities of
the restaurant. The broad scope and continuous nature of this single act
most surely constitutes a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. To hold
otherwise would exempt the most effective acts of discrimination, and
place a premium on the most pervasive policies of discrimination.
Id. at 379.
218. See, e.g., Richberg, 398 F.2d at 527 (discussing several factors court ex-
amined to determine status of alleged club). The Richberg court held that the din-
ner club "ha[d] the birthmark of law evasion." Id. at 529. Its memberships cards
were issued upon request with minimal or no investigation; one person could issue
the cards despite a bylaw that required unanimous approval of the board of direc-
tors; one officer of the club insisted he was not a member, contrary to a bylaw that
required officers to be members; and one man received the club's profits. See id. at
527.
219. See United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 95 (E.D.
La. 1967) (listing principal premise for private club status). In Jack Sabin's Private
Club, the court found that incorporation of the restaurant as a private club still
deprived black customers of full enjoyment of their rights under the Act. See id. at
94-95. Further, the defendants had the right to establish a private club, but it
would have to be "formed and actually operated by them as a private club not in
fact open to the public." Id. at 95. The club would then qualify as exempt from
the public accommodation provision of the Act. See id.
220. See Richberg, 398 F.2d at 526 (indicating need to establish facts before
status as private club can be addressed as question of law).
221. SeeWright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (refer-
ring to Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969)). "The Su-
preme Court indicated that a private club is 'non-profit, member-owned and
controlled, and selective as to membership and use of club facilities."' Id.
31
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In Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, the court explained:
"[i]n determining whether an establishment is in fact a private
club, there is no single test. A number of variables must be ex-
amined in the light of the Act's clear purpose of protecting only
'the genuine privacy of private clubs ... whose membership is gen-
uinely selective.' "222 Each factor tips the balance for or against an
establishment's qualification as a private club.22
3
First, courts remain intensely focused on a club as a "pluralistic
enterprise. '" 224 A club cannot be "one man's principality or do-
main [;] [i]t cannot be his alter ego."225 Courts will also investigate
the commercial interests served by the alleged private club.22 6 Ad-
ditionally, courts will examine the amount of effort the owner of
the establishment exerts in increasing membership and profitabil-
ity.2 2 7 When members determine how the establishment's profits
are used, the assumption is that private club status is legitimate. 228
If members have little or no say, however, or if the profits are fun-
neled directly to the owner of the establishment, courts will deny
private club status.229 In other words, if one person operates the
222. 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968) (referencing remarks of Senator
Humphrey in legislative history of Act).
223. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1150 (asserting that case law has not recre-
ated definition for private club). In Wright, the court held that a club open to only
white people, which solicited membership applications from large groups, did not
limit the use of its facilities to members, had a president who benefited financially
from the club, and advertised, did not qualify as an exempt private club. See id. at
1154-57 (announcing factors considered and holding of case).
224. See Richberg, 398 F.2d at 529 (naming one factor courts use to determine
if entity is private club).
225. Id. (emphasizing that club must consist of multiple people rather than
act as mask for individual's business).
226. See Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 1980) (an-
nouncing additional factor courts weigh in determining if club qualifies as private
establishment).
227. See id. (adding that courts will also consider efforts owner makes in in-
creasing financial success of establishment). For example, in Salisbury Club, the
president of the housing development's corporation set aside memberships to en-
sure homebuyers became members; he served as president of the club as well as
one of the initial incorporators; he took every opportunity to inform potential
home buyers of benefits of the country club; the housing development used the
club to entertain buyers; and potential buyers received membership materials as
well. See id. The court explained "[t]he intimate, longstanding, and continuing
relationship between the subdivision developer and the Salisbury Club completely
undercuts the club's contention that it is truly private." Id.
228. See Richberg, 398 F.2d at 527 (demonstrating court's examination of fi-
nancial factors of alleged private club).
229. See id. (explaining members' minimal control over the club or allocation
of profits suggests club is not legitimately private); see also United States v. Johnson
Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (pointing out that establish-
ment's profits were not shared with membership and thus did not indicate private
club status); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 378 (E.D. La. 1969) (offer-
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facility for that person's benefit, an establishment cannot claim pri-
vate club status. 230 Likewise, courts examine the extent, if any, of
the members' control over operations of the club.23 1 Courts also
ponder whether control or ownership changed hands when the es-
tablishment became a private, membership-based club.23 2
Second, courts consider the size of the organization in con-
junction with the open-ended character of the membership list.233
Where a large membership exists, or where the admissions policy
requires no background investigation of applicants, one can pre-
sume membership is not limited.234 Also, requiring an applicant to
reside in the locality of the club suggests a private establishment.2 35
Moreover, mandating that applicants fill out an application and un-
dergo investigation by a membership committee indicates private
club status. 23 6 If the group has a selective process for admitting and
rejecting members, status as a private club is more easily proved. 23 7
Therefore, "[s] electivity is the essence of a private club."23 8
In conjunction with selectivity of membership, courts will often
examine the degree of membership control over the establish-
ment's internal governance. 23 9 In addition to having some basis for
ing that establishment was sham when operated for owner's profit); United States
v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. La. 1967) (noting that owner
received all profits of establishment).
230. See Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (rec-
ognizing that if club financially benefits only one person or small group of people,
it is likely not private).
231. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375-76 (offering further information on con-
trol of private club).
232. See id. at 376 (noting that change in ownership system suggests private
club).
233. See Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir.
1968) (naming second factor courts consider). Most private clubs limit their mem-
bership lists and have clear admission requirements. See id. (citing Bradshaw v.
Whigman, 11 Race Rel.L.Rep. 934, 934 (S.D. Fla. 1966)).
234. See id. (citing Note, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 244, 247 n.21 (1967)) (demon-
strating that few limits on membership plus zero criteria for admissibility suggest
private club).
235. See United States v. Trustees of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee
Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (giving example of selec-
tivity factor).
236. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375 (indicating example of proof of private
club selectively requirement); see also, e.g., Trustees of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472
F. Supp. at 1176 (offering example).
237. See, e.g., Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(stating that this and other courts have consistently held where facility is generally
open to "broad range of public," it does not qualify for private club exemption).
238. Id.
239. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1203 (D. Conn. 1974) (adding criterion courts consider in conjunction with sec-
ond factor). If no criteria exist for choosing members, courts hesitate to allow the
33
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selection of members, the facility must have in place a procedure
which allows current members to screen membership applica-
tions.240 Most commonly, a membership committee, selected to re-
present the members, controls admissions. 241 These committees
have the power to reject an applicant despite being recommended
by another member, to give notice of pending applications, and to
notify individuals after their applications have been accepted; all of
these characteristics provide evidence of a private club. 242 Further-
more, many courts have observed that legitimate private clubs nor-
mally reject large numbers of applicants compared to the numbers
they accept. 243
Third, courts evaluate whether the alleged club holds meetings
with its members.244 "An organization 'can hardly be a private asso-
ciation where the members do not meet together.' , 245 If the mem-
bers have input in creating and enforcing the policies of the
establishment, the establishment is more likely a private club.246
Moreover, courts also consider the observation of other formalities
establishment to claim private club status. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1151 (not-
ing courts' hesitance when selection criteria are absent). If members ignore these
standards, private club status is similarly not granted. See id. ("A private club must
have some basis for its selectivity and must have machinery whereby applications
for membership are screened by members."); see also, e.g., United States v. Jordan,
302 F. Supp. 370, 374 (E.D. La. 1969) (demonstrating lack of selectivity or control
in choosing members of club). A person could come to the door of the club, fill
out an application for membership, pay dues, and immediately receive a member-
ship card. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 374. The individual would then be free to use
the establishment's amenities. See id. (illustrating instance of lack of selection of
members). The establishment rejected zero applicants during approximately the
first three weeks of operation. See id.
240. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1151 (indicating private clubs have
processes in place for members to evaluate membership applications).
241. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375 (suggesting key method private clubs use
to exercise control over membership).
242. See id. (providing examples of control over membership in private club).
Further evidence of private club status includes whether the membership commit-
tee has control over revocation of memberships, if recommendations of existing
members are needed for applicants, and whether any limits, other than the capac-
ity of the facility, exist on the number of members. See id.
243. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 101-02
(4th Cir. 1968) (holding that ninety-nine percent of white applicants accepted,
and one hundred percent of black applicants rejected strongly suggested not pri-
vate club); see also Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 377 (suggesting true private club would
not accept 2,400 applicants and reject zero in one year).
244. See Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102 (mentioning third factor courts consider).
245. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (quoting Nesmith, 397 F.2d
at 102).
246. See Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102 (remarking that member participation in
formulating club policies indicates private club status).
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of private clubs.2 47 Courts examine whether there are bylaws, mem-
bership cards, an initiation ceremony, a roster of members, and a
formal procedure for allowing guests of members to use the
facilities. 248
Fourth, courts examine any financial contributions the alleged
private club receives from the public.249 Receiving public funding
takes an establishment out of the private club exemption. 250
Fifth, courts evaluate whether the alleged club has actively
solicited potential members through advertising.2 51 Extensive ad-
vertisement negates a club's attempt to characterize itself as pri-
vate.25 2 Courts ask if the patrons of the establishment that
preceded the club received a membership solicitation and if adver-
tising to solicit members occurred at the club's formation. 253
Therefore, a peripheral question, for example, is under what head-
ing in the telephone book does the establishment appear.254 More
importantly, some courts inquire whether media stories and adver-
tisements were published solely for the purpose of soliciting public-
ity and new members. 255
247. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376 (introducing club formalities as areas of
focus for courts).
248. See id. (recognizing formalities of private clubs courts look for in deter-
mining status). Allowing nonmembers, those who are not bona fide guests of
members, to access and use facilities defeats private club status. See Cork Club, 315
F. Supp. at 1151-52 ("A genuine private club limits the use of club facilities or
services to members and bona fide guests." (quoting Note, 30 MoNT.L.REv. 47, 52
(1968)).
249. See Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102 (noting 20% of organization's funding came
public financing).
250. See id. (explaining reliance upon public funding suggests public facility,
not private club).
251. See Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1980) (not-
ing advertising in local newsletter, property guide, and distribution of application
forms). In Salisbury Club, a black couple excluded from their housing develop-
ment's country club filed suit; the Fourth Circuit held that the club was not pri-
vate, and, therefore, exclusion of the couple violated the Act. See id. at 310.
252. See id. at 313 (signaling considerable advertisments will persuade court
that establishment is not private club). Courts have traditionally viewed advertis-
ing and publicity in the media as being "inconsistent with the claim of private club
status." See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1152 (stating advertising injures claim of
private club status especially when used to increase income).
253. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376 (offering questions courts ask to deter-
mine if club was created to be legitimate private club).
254. See id. (mentioning additional characteristic courts can use to determine
if facility is private club). Brothels list their services under "massage" in the Yellow
Pages. See Nevada Brothels Want to be Good Neighbor; Legal Businesses Seek to Pay Taxes,
supra note 61 (pointing out where brothels are listed in telephone book).
255. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376 (suggesting use of media for publicity
inhibits private club status). On the other hand, other actions, such as civil contri-
butions and other forms of notoriety, do not necessarily negate private status. See,
35
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Sixth, courts examine the history of the establishment, focus-
ing mainly on whether the establishment was a new endeavor or if
its owners made inconsequential changes to an existing facility.2
56
In addition to the history of the establishment, courts also consider
the club's current purpose, and if any membership rights arise as a
result of the change in the facility's status.25 7 More importantly,
courts look to see if any of the club's purposes could be accom-
plished without using the membership scheme. 258
Finally, courts take interest in whether the alleged private club
claimed a social exemption in filing its federal taxes. 25 9 A club's
failure to claim such an exemption indicates a lack of private club
e.g., Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (clarify-
ing not all forms of advertising indicate pubic establishment). For example, in
Solomon the court explained that the publicity the club earned was incidental to
club's mission of community involvement, but none of this indirect advertising
aimed to increase membership. See id. (identifying example when publicity or ad-
vertising does not indicate public establishment). In Solomon, the court held that a
private women's club that did not accept a new member unless she had the en-
dorsement of three people, which operated solely for the members' benefit and
received funds only from private sources, was not established to exclude black wo-
men. See id. at 44-45, 48.
256. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376. In Jordan, a restaurant owner discontin-
ued operation of his restaurant, and one week later reopened as a private dining
club. See id. at 373 (offering example of superficial change in operation of busi-
ness). Also, the facilities of the alleged private club were essentially the same as
those used by the establishment when it operated as a restaurant. See id. at 374.
Moreover, the club had eight employees and the restaurant had typically employed
nine. See id. For most of the time the club was operational, it was open for busi-
ness the identical hours of when it was a restaurant. See id. The only changes the
court noted included that the roadside sign which now reflected the new club's
name and new shirts indicating that the establishment was now a private club. See
id. The previous owner, his wife, and one other individual subscribed to the stock
of the corporation. See id. at 373. In addition, the previous owner became the
chairman of the incorporators, and only one meeting of that group was held. See
id. Additionally, those three individuals elected a board of directors, with them-
selves constituting the entire board. See id. Finally, the board elected the former
owner as president of the private club, the club leased the restaurant to the new
corporation, the former owner loaned the corporation working capital, and he
remained manager of the establishment. See id.
257. See id. at 374-76 (adding miscellaneous considerations regarding purpose
of club that courts consider). Further, courts examine if the club has a civic or
other social purpose. See id. at 376.
258. See id. (indicating courts' concerns about using private club status to ac-
complish establishment's discriminatory purposes). In Jordan, the court specifi-
cally referred to the special purpose of "keeping undesirable characters out of the
establishment" as one which would require further examination by the court. See
id.
259. See Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (offer-
ing final factor courts consider in determining private club status); see also Jordan,
302 F. Supp. at 376 (adding that taking advantage of alternate licensing and tax
exemptions suggests private club status).
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status. 260 For example, in Bradshaw v. Whigam, the court pointed
out that the alleged private club paid sales tax on dues paid by
members, despite a Florida tax provision that private club dues
were not subject to sales tax. 26 1
While the applicability of several of these factors to the Stud
Farm is premature at this time, two factors stand out as the largest
hurdles the Stud Farm will face if Fleiss attempts to operate it as a
private club. One problematic factor is the first listed: a club can-
not be one person's endeavor or alter ego. 262 News reports have
established that Fleiss formed this business enterprise with the ex-
press intent of making money.263 Fleiss wants to run a legal form of
her former business, mainly because of her financial success in her
previous attempt.264 It is unrealistic to think that Fleiss would share
profits with members or relinquish control of the operations to the
membership body.
The fifth factor listed, the extent of advertising an establish-
ment uses, presents the other problem.2 65 Although Fleiss has not
initiated any plans to advertise her brothel in the mass media, the
issue of advertising still exists. 266 To date, Fleiss hosts a personal
website, complete with a link to the Stud Farm's website. 267 Thus,
the website serves to advertise both Fleiss and her Stud Farm.2 68 In
addition, Fleiss has given numerous interviews about her brothel.
2 69
260. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1152 (concluding that failure to claim club
exemption on tax return indicates public establishment).
261. See 11 Race Rel.L.Rep. 934, 934 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (exemplifying that fail-
ure to utilize tax and licensing provisions favorable to private clubs will indicate
public establishment).
262. For a further discussion of one factor courts analyze to determine if an
establishment qualifies for the private club exemption, see supra notes 224-30 and
accompanying text.
263. For a further discussion of Fleiss's monetary motivations behind the Stud
Farm, see supra notes 7, 99, 107 and accompanying text.
264. For a further discussion of Fleiss's motives in opening the Stud Farm, see
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
265. For a further discussion of another factor courts judge when determin-
ing if private club status exists, see supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text. Reg-
ulations prohibit brothels from advertising. See ALBERT, supra note 12, at 181
(claiming ban on brothel advertising).
266. For a further discussion of an establishment's advertising efforts and
their impact on private club status, see supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
267. See Heidi's Home Page, http://www.heidifleiss.com/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2006) (showing how to access Stud Farm website).
268. See id. (noting how website serves as online advertisement for Fleiss and
her brothel).
269. See Navarro, supra note 8 (offering example of interview Fleiss has given);
see also Allan, supra note 92.
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Fleiss herself comes with notoriety.2 70 She has been newsworthy for
over a decade; first, she was the premier madam to Hollywood, and
later, she fought criminal charges. 2 7' Movies depicted her exploits,
books were published, articles were written, and her former associ-
ates made the talk show circuit.27 2 Moreover, Fleiss created other
business ventures that continue to increase her notoriety.273 Argua-
bly, any of these forms of publicity operate as free advertising for
Fleiss and her brothel. Finally, Fleiss may attempt to become a
member of the Nevada Brothel Association. 274 Membership would
give her a voice in the legalized brothel legislation arena, as well as
affiliate her brothel with other legitimate brothels. 275 That voice
and affiliation would bring more publicity to her Stud Farm, thus
arguably constituting another form of advertising.
C. Brothels as State Actors
The state action doctrine arises when a private entity or indi-
vidual exercises powers that are traditionally and exclusively re-
served for the states. 2 76 State action occurs in two ways. First, state
participation in an otherwise private activity can result in a
recharacterization of that activity as one of state action. 2 77 Second,
when private actors closely align themselves with a state's action or
state actors, the activity becomes one of state action. 278 "[T]he
question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private...
or amounts to 'state action,' . . . frequently admits no easy answer.
'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvi-
ous involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
270. For a further discussion of Fleiss's fame or infamy, see supra note 3 (re-
garding her as the Hollywood Madam and as key to men in entertainment).
271. For a further discussion on Fleiss's widespread publicity, see supra notes
3, 100-04 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Heidi's Home Page, supra note 267.
273. For a list of other business opportunities Fleiss participates in, see
Heidi's Home Page, supra note 267 (pointing out Fleiss's other business ventures).
274. For a further discussion on how Fleiss may join the Nevada Brothel Asso-
ciation, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
275. For a further discussion explaining the purpose of the Nevada Brothel
Association, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1144-47 (5th Cir. 1977);
Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253-54 (1st Cir. 1996)
(defining doctrine of state action).
277. See Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1144 (describing when private action can be-
come state action).
278. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 253-54 (offering second method for becoming state
actor or state action).
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true significance. "' 279 The Supreme Court clarified that the dis-
criminatory conduct need not originate with a state if the state en-
forces, encourages, or supports discrimination by private
individuals. 280 Therefore, the questionable status of brothels as
state actors represents another potential legal battleground for
Fleiss and those opposed to her policy that bars male-to-male ser-
vices at her Stud Farm.
1. State Regulation and the Flow of Money Make Brothels State Actors
Fleiss's opponents can argue that Nevada county governments,
as agents of the state, so intimately entangle themselves with the
activities of brothels that the brothels are not private entities, but
rather state actors. 28' Two arguments offer support: first, the state
and its municipalities encourage Fleiss's conduct; and second, the
strict regulation limits Fleiss's freedom to act as a private entity.28 2
In reviewing when discriminatory state action occurs, the Su-
preme Court has noted that state involvement arises where the state
merely encourages, rather than commands, discrimination. 283 One
key example of encouragement of private conduct remains Reitman
v. Mulkey.284 In Reitman, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the California Supreme Court's holding that an article of the state
constitution highly implicated the state in private discrimination. 28 5
The Court held that when a state takes affirmative action designed
to make private discrimination valid, the private entity becomes a
state actor. 286 Further, the Court held that an article of the state
279. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (quoting Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
280. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (emphasizing discrimina-
tory conduct does not necessarily come from state but can come from private en-
tity receiving support from state).
281. For a further discussion and examples of the community involvement of
brothels, as well as the regulation of brothels, see supra notes 53-76.
282. See generally Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838-43 (1982) (estab-
lishing different state action theories); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175; Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
283. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961)) (noting statute invalid that authorizes racial
discrimination).
284. See id. at 380-81 (indicating that state encouragement and support of
private conduct reflects state action).
285. See id. at 378-79 (mentioning procedural history of case). The California
Supreme Court examined an article of the state constitution forbidding the state
from denying individuals the right to decline to sell, lease, or rent property to
anyone that person wants. See id. at 371-73.
286. See id. at 375 (affirming state supreme court's decision that state action
occurred).
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constitution permitted, and even encouraged, discrimination.2 8 7
By encouraging and thereby authorizing discrimination, the state
became the private entity's partner in the discriminatory
conduct.2 8 8
With the Stud Farm, Fleiss's opponents can argue that Ne-
vada's counties, acting as state agents, have encouraged Fleiss's dis-
criminatory policy. Most importantly, opponents can point to at
least one Nevada legislator who publicly opposed the policy. 28 9 As-
semblyman Parks warned of his intention to seek a legal opinion on
the discriminatory policy of the Stud Farm. 290 Parks's position in
Nevada government and his willingness to speak publicly about his
opposition to the policy alert members of Nevada's government of
the impending controversy. 29' By refusing to address the Stud
Farm's discriminatory policy, even after public opposition from a
Nevada legislator, it arguably appears that the state and its counties
have no problem with the policy. Fleiss's opponents can claim this
lack of a state government response acts as proof that Fleiss's policy
amounts to state action. Additionally, Fleiss's opponents can claim
that the state of Nevada and its counties have encouraged or sup-
ported the Stud Farm's discriminatory policy by failing to pass ap-
propriate anti-discrimination legislation.292
Similarly, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, state licensing of pri-
vate clubs' alcohol distribution served as the foundation for bring-
ing a state action claim.293 The plaintiff maintained that because
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board issued the private club a
liquor license, the club had become a state actor. 294 In finding that
the club was not a state actor, the Supreme Court noted that there
was no "symbiotic relationship" between the Liquor Control Board
287. See id. (signaling case example of when state-encouraged conduct consti-
tuted state action).
288. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375 (announcing Court's holding).
289. For a further discussion on how Assemblyman Parks could challenge the
brothel's policy, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
290. See id. (indicating forewarning from homosexual legislator about Fleiss's
Stud Farm policy and potential violation of Nevada's anti-bias law).
291. See Nevada Legislature, supra note 9 (directing individuals to openly gay
legislator's online government profile).
292. For a further discussion on how sexual orientation is not included as a
characteristic worthy of protection under Nevada's anti-discrimination statute, see
supra note 186 and accompanying text.
293. 407 U.S. 163, 163 (1972) (naming case where state participation in activi-
ties of private club resulted in state action claim).
294. See id. at 165 (stating plaintiffs general argument for considering private
club as state actor).
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and the Moose Lodge. 295 However, Fleiss's opponents can distin-
guish their position from the Court's position in Moose Lodge and
use that decision to advocate their position. 296 Opponents can ex-
pose the symbiotic relationship between Fleiss as a brothel owner
and the county as a state agent.29 7 Brothel owners and prostitutes
engage in a business that is illegal in every other state in the coun-
try.298 From that, money pours into the state and local communi-
ties and, in turn, benefits those economies. 299 Therefore, the Stud
Farm and local governments have a symbiotic relationship.
Finally, Fleiss's opponents can rely upon Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., Inc. to support their claim that the Stud Farm is a state
actor.300 Lugar announced a two-prong approach for determining
if certain conduct can be attributable to the state: (1) the conduct,
or deprivation of a right, must be caused by the exercise of some
state-created right or by a rule imposed by the state or a state offi-
cial, and (2) the actor must be a person who may fairly be said to be
a state actor.301 The Supreme Court further clarified the second
prong as involving a state official, a person who has acted together
295. See id. at 175 (pointing out no mutually beneficial relationship existed
like that in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority). In Burton, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of a black man from a privately operated restaurant in a
city-owned parking facility constituted discriminatory state action. See 365 U.S.
715, 724-26 (1961). There, the restaurant owner received the benefit of location
in a state-created parking facility, while the parking authority provided parking
spaces by leasing parts of the building for commercial activity. See id. (describing
"peculiar relationship" between parking garage and restaurant).
296. For a further discussion of Moose Lodge, see supra notes 293-95 and ac-
companying text. Fleiss's opponents may also be able to distinguish Moose Lodge by
pointing out that the Moose Lodge was a private club and the Stud Farm, at least
to date, is a public accommodation. For a further discussion of public accommo-
dations, see supra notes 171-91 and accompanying text.
297. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724 (confirming "that the peculiar relationship of
the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an
incidental variety of mutual benefits").
298. For a further discussion of Nevada as the only state with legalized prosti-
tution, see supra note 182.
299. For a further discussion of the financial benefits of legalized prostitution
in Nevada, see supra notes 58, 61-66 and accompanying text.
300. 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982) (holding that state action deprived debtor of
his property when subjected to prejudgment attachment procedure under state
law).
301. See id. at 937 (articulating test for state action Court gleaned from past
cases). The Lugar Court went on to explain Moose Lodge as the primary case that
demonstrates the first prong. See id. at 937-38 (citing Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171-
79). The Lugar Court summarized Moose Lodge by saying that the decision to dis-
criminate could not be attributed to any governmental decisions and that any gov-
ernmental decisions that affected the Moose Lodge were not related to its
discriminatory conduct. See id. at 938 (referring to Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 177).
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with the state, or a person who has received significant aid from the
state.30
2
Here, Fleiss's opponents can embrace the first prong.30 3 In
Lugar, the Court held that the aid of state officials in state-created
attachment procedures was sufficient to establish state action.30 4
With the Stud Farm, Fleiss's opponents can argue that Nevada, and
its counties as state agents, have created a set of rules that make the
state responsible for Fleiss's conduct.30 5 Opponents can claim that
the counties allow brothels to establish their own rules regarding
who can be a brothel patron.30 6 From that, opponents can argue
that by significantly regulating brothels, yet failing to address any of
the practices brothels employ for allowing or disallowing customers,
the state has granted brothels the privilege to deny services to
whomever they please. Therefore, by allowing Nevada and its coun-
ties to deny homosexuals the right to patronize the Stud Farm, the
state legislature has authorized the practice of selective admittance
to the brothel, thus creating state action.
2. Brothels and the State Are Only Tenuously Connected and Therefore
There Is No State Action
To respond to attacks that the Stud Farm is a state actor, Fleiss
can cite past Supreme Court decisions where the Court failed to
find that the state's conduct was sufficient to constitute state action.
Fleiss can wield the Moose Lodge precedent as her strongest weapon
against the claim that her brothel is a state actor.30 7 She can argue
that county licensing with state approval does not create an interde-
302. See id. at 937 (clarifying instances in which entity's or person's conduct is
fairly classified as state action). The Lugar Court identified Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks as an example of the second prong. See id. at 939 (citing 436 U.S. 149, 164-
66 (1978)). The Flagg Brothers Court determined that action by a private party
pursuant to a state statute was not sufficient to justify characterizing the private
party as a state actor without more. See id. at 938-39 (citing Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S.
at 157). Consequently, the Flagg Brothers Court suggested the need for something
more to convert a private party to a state actor. See id. at 939 (citing Flagg Brothers,
436 U.S. at 157).
303. For a further discussion of the two-prong approach announced in Lugar,
see supra note 301 and accompanying text.
304. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 (offering that when state has created system
where state officials attach property based on ex parte application of one private
party, there is state action).
305. For a further discussion of instances of conduct classified as state action,
see supra notes 277-78.
306. For a further discussion of county-based brothel regulation, see supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
307. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 163 (1972) (naming case
Fleiss can use to support her position that her brothel is not state actor).
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pendent relationship between brothels and municipalities. 30 8
Therefore, she should be free to refuse to provide male-to-male ser-
vices at her brothel.
The possibility exists in licensed operations, that state involve-
ment will be so great that the license holder becomes a state ac-
tor.30 9 In Moose Lodge, a private club refused to serve a black man;
he sued, claiming that the club's refusal to serve him constituted
state action because the Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board
had issued the club a license to sell alcohol.310 The Supreme Court
held that the licensing scheme of the Liquor Control Board did not
sufficiently implicate the state in the club's discriminatory prac-
tices.3 The Court clarified that the mere receipt of services from
the state did not make a private entity a state actor. 312 In fact, the
Court distinctly highlighted past precedent by declaring that its
"holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is
private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself in invidious
discriminations' in order for the discriminatory action to fall within
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition."3 1 3 Finally, the Court
noted that the Liquor Control Board had no influence on the oper-
ation of the Moose Lodge as a private club.3 14 With no role in the
308. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961)
(pointing to one characteristic that can be used to indicate state actor).
309. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176 (standing for proposition that state
licensing of private club may prompt legal challenge based on state action).
310. See id. at 164-66 (stating facts of case).
311. See id. at 177 (indicating Court's holding). "[T] he operation of the regu-
latory scheme . . . does not sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory
guest policies of Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state action' within the ambit of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
312. See id. at 173 (detailing distinction between state actor and lesser degree
of state involvement). The Court explained:
The Court has never held.., that discrimination by an otherwise private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private en-
tity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished
services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and
fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction
between private as distinguished from state conduct ....
Id.
313. Id. (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
314. See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 175 (announcing that Liquor Control Board
had no impact on establishing or enforcing membership or other policies of club
to which it issued licenses). The district court pointed out the "'pervasive'" over-
sight of the Liquor Control Board on private clubs, noting that the Board can
require clubs to make physical alterations, file a list of members and employees,
keep detailed financial records, and remain open to inspection at any time. See id.
at 176. The Supreme Court discounted these findings by saying that they do not
amount to encouraging discrimination or making the state a partner of the club.
See id. at 176-77.
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operation of the private club, the Court turned to the license itself
to determine if the licensing scheme caused Moose Lodge to be-
come a state actor.3 15  The record did not indicate that state law
discriminated against minorities' rights to apply for Liquor Control
Board licenses or to buy liquor in public accommodations.3 1 6
To operate the brothel, both Fleiss's Stud Farm and its employ-
ees must obtain county licenses. 317 Like in Moose Lodge, these li-
censes do not impact the brothel's internal operations or policies.
Rather, they are directed toward the health of the employees and
patrons. 318 Moreover, Fleiss can argue that those licenses merely
serve to limit and account for legal brothels, not to inject state or
county influence into the brothel's operations. 319 Therefore, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court ruling in Moose Lodge, any incidental re-
quirements the licenses impose on the Stud Farm and its employees
do not encourage discrimination of homosexuals or make Nevada
the brothel's partner. 320 To be sure, the licensing scheme does not
appear to be discriminatory against homosexuals either.3 21 Overall,
the licensing requirement imposed on brothels in Nevada suggests,
at best, the tenuous finding that a private establishment like the
Stud Farm constitutes a state actor.
For further support of her policy, Fleiss may also turn to Reit-
man v. Mulkey. 322 In Reitman, the United States Supreme Court
held that the California constitution's permission of housing dis-
crimination amounted to state action.32 3 In doing so, the Court
explained that "[t] he right to discriminate .. .was now embodied
in the State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or
315. See id. at 176 (recognizing other aspect of licensing that could qualify
private club as state actor).
316. See id. (analyzing why liquor control license did not make private club
state actor). The only impact the license had on those outside the Moose Lodge
was the possibility of limiting the licenses available because of a maximum number
permitted within a certain municipality, dictated by a quota. See id.
317. For a further discussion of the county-based licensing requirements for
brothels, see supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
318. For a discussion of brothel regulations focused on health, see supra notes
23, 67 and accompanying text.
319. For a further discussion of the licensing process of Nevada brothels, see
supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
320. For a further discussion of the similarities between the Moose Lodge and
the Stud Farm, see supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text.
321. For a further discussion comparing the licensing scheme in Moose Lodge
to that of the brothels, see supra notes 293-95.
322. See 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (recognizing that state involvement in
private conduct must be judged on case-by-case basis).
323. See id. (highlighting that United States Supreme Court adopted state su-
preme court's rationale).
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judicial regulation at any level of the state government. '" 324 The
Court expressly stated that under the article in question, those indi-
viduals who were practicing discrimination could operate under ex-
press constitutional authority and be free from any official
scrutiny.325 Relying on Reitman, Fleiss can argue that courts look
for express involvement by the state in identifying state action.3 26
Fleiss can posit that because no legislation or other explicit support
for discrimination exists at either the county or state level, as was
the case in Reitman, her brothel is not a state actor.3 27 As a private
actor, Fleiss can claim that she is entitled to conduct her brothel
business as she wishes.
In addition, Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. also supports Fleiss's
position.328 There, a utility customer sued a privately owned utility
company for cancellation of her service before giving notice, a
hearing, and the chance to pay past due amounts. 329 The Supreme
Court determined that the state was not sufficiently connected to
the service cancellation to constitute state action by the utility com-
pany.330 The customer argued that although the utility company
was privately owned and operated, the state regulated much of its
business.331 The Court quickly clarified that "[t] he mere fact that a
business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its
action into that of the State .... [n]or does the fact that the regula-
tion is extensive and detailed .... ,,332 Pointing to this language,
Fleiss can maintain that Nevada's regulation of its brothels creates
an insufficient nexus to classify them as state actors. Like the utility
company in Jackson, the Stud Farm is privately owned and operated
324. Id. at 377.
325. See id. (concluding that article at issue gave express permission to
discriminate).
326. See id. at 378-80 (recognizing case that shows need to look for direct
involvement by state).
327. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376 (noting that California's Constitution specifi-
cally involves state in discrimination).
328. 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974) (permitting utility company to discontinue ser-
vice to any customer).
329. See id. at 346, 347 (setting forth facts of case).
330. See id. at 358-59 (articulating holding of Court that denied nexus be-
tween state and private utility company).
331. See id. at 350 (examining state regulations on utility and insufficient ef-
fect such registration had on characterizing state action).
332. Id. (referencing that state regulation does not necessarily indicate state
action). The Court explained that the actions of a heavily regulated industry will
more frequently be state actions. See id. at 350-51. However, the required inquiry
remains whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the en-
tity's action so that the action can be fairly treated as the state's own. See id. at 350
(citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)).
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and will be subject to significant county regulation. This factual
similarity suggests that a court following the Jackson decision would
find that the Stud Farm is not a state actor.
Jackson helps Fleiss defend herself as a private actor in two addi-
tional ways. In Jackson, the state required the utility company to file
a general tariff, one provision of which stated the utility's right to
cancel service for nonpayment. 333 The Supreme Court noted that
the district court's findings showed that the only connection be-
tween the utility company and the state was the filing of the tariff,
followed by the lack of any action by the state to prohibit it.334 With
the Stud Farm, Fleiss can argue that the only connection with Ne-
vada is through county, not state, business regulations and li-
censes.3 35 Further, Fleiss can argue that many Nevada businesses
are subject to regulation yet are able to maintain their status as pri-
vate entities rather than state actors. 336
The final way Jackson supports Fleiss's Stud Farm policy centers
around the lack of a symbiotic relationship between the state and
the private entity.33 7 In Jackson, the Court determined there was no
symbiotic relationship between the state and the utility company.338
In particular, the Court noted that the utility company alone was
responsible for providing its power services to customers. 339 Also,
the utility was privately owned and operated, and it paid taxes like
other corporations in the state. 340 According to the Court, the
333. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 (referring to another element of case that
supports Fleiss's position: state tariff had previously never been used to establish
status as state actor).
334. See id. at 355 (explaining weak connection between private utility and
state). "'The only apparent state involvement with the activity complained of here
is in [the] Tariff Reg[ulation] .... No state official participated in the practice
complained of, nor is it alleged that the state requested or co-operated in the sus-
pension of service."' Id. at 355 n.15 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 348 F.
Supp. 951, 958 (M.D. Pa. 1972)).
335. For a further discussion on the regulation of brothels at the county level
and examples of such regulations, see supra notes 55-77.
336. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (stating that utilities, by their very nature, are
often required by state regulation to get approval for practices that other, less
stringently regulated businesses would be free to implement without regulatory
approval). The approval by a state official or agency, where the official or agency
has not "put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it,"
does not amount to state action. Id.
337. For an illustration of the symbiotic relationship that demonstrates state
action, as seen in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, see supra notes 295, 297
and accompanying text.
338. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (stating no symbiotic relationship present to
constitute state action).
339. See id. at 358 (mentioning state had no responsibility to customers of
utility).
340. See id. (listing two ways utility was similar to other businesses in state).
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combination of these factors showed only a heavily regulated, pri-
vately-owned utility company that chose to cancel service in a man-
ner permitted by state law.341 Similarly, Fleiss can argue that the
Stud Farm is a privately owned business that will operate in a state
regulated environment and will pay taxes just as any other business
in the state. Therefore, similar to the utility company in Jackson, the
Stud Farm cannot be considered a state actor.
Fleiss can further support her claim that she is a private actor
by citing Blum v. Yaretsky. 342 There, the Court indicated that a state
can be held responsible for a private action only when the state
exercises coercive power or significant encouragement.3 43 "Mere
approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not
sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives
under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. '' 344 Following this
rationale, Fleiss can argue that the counties, as state agents, do not
exercise any coercive or encouraging control over her brothel. The
county merely provides basic license requirements that amount to
no more coercion or encouragement than any other business re-
ceives. Without the county's oversight of her business operations,
Fleiss can claim that the county has acquiesced to her policies, and
that the level of influence does not rise to the level necessary for
finding state action.
Another case where the Supreme Court addressed state action
is Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.34 5 There, the Court announced that acts of
a private party become those of a state when the private party acts
in concert with state actors. 346 Noteably, the Court identified one
341. See id. (concluding utility remained private actor despite intense state
regulation).
342. 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (holding Medicaid recipients "failed to estab-
lish 'state action' in the nursing homes' decisions to discharge or transfer Medi-
caid patients to lower levels of care" and thus failed to prove violations of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights).
343. See id. at 1004 (noting characteristic of state action). In Blum, the Court
held that regulations which allegedly "impose a range of penalties on nursing
homes that fail to discharge or transfer patients," do not mandate the decision to
move patients, they simply encourage discharge or transfer, and thus did not con-
stitute state action. See id. at 1009-10.
344. Id. at 1004-05. In Blum, the state required the filing of patient assess-
ment forms with state Medicaid officials, but nothing in the regulations authorized
state officials to approve or disapprove patient transfer or discharge decisions. See
id. at 1010. Instead, the state approved or disapproved payment of benefits after a
change in a patient's medical services. See id.
345. 457 U.S. 830, 836-37 (1982) (holding discharged teachers at nonprofit,
privately operated high school did not state claim for state action and were not due
relief for deprivation of civil rights).
346. See, e.g., id. at 838 n.6 (tracing history of cases leading to this principle).
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factor that may indicate state action as whether the state actor per-
forms a public function.347 The issue appears to be whether the
function performed has been "'traditionally the exclusive preroga-
tive of the State.' ,348
Fleiss can distinguish her Stud Farm from Rendell-Baker. Unlike
public education, which was at issue in Rendell-Baker, the Stud Farm
does not provide a public function. County governments regulate
brothels so significantly that they substantially limit the activities
that take place inside the brothels. 349 By limiting the permitted be-
havior at brothels, Fleiss can argue that the state and county govern-
ments actually make brothels less available to the public. Finally,
Fleiss can rely on the mantra from Rendell-Baker: "That a private
entity performs a function which serves the public does not make its
acts state action. '350 From this, Fleiss can maintain that the mere
fact that her Stud Farm will be open to the public does not establish
her Stud Farm as a state actor. Rather, her Stud Farm remains a
private actor because it lacks any substantial connection to the state
and provides no public function that is traditionally reserved exclu-
sively for the states.3 5 1
IV. CONCLUSION
Offering the Stud Farm's services to homosexual men will
make a forceful impact. In fact, some may even argue that this im-
pact has just as much importance as the gay rights movement, con-
stitutional rights defense, or even sex. The powerful force packing
this substantial impact is money. Surveys estimate homosexuals
347. See id. at 842 (enumerating one characteristic of state actor). The Court
stated, however, that "(t] he relevant question is not simply whether a private group
is serving a 'public function .... ' Id. Therefore, serving a public function is not
automatically indicative of a state action. See id.
348. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). In
Rendell-Baker, the Court emphasized education as a public function because the
state planned to provide for students at the state's expense. See id. The Court
made sure to clarify that a state legislative policy demonstrating the intent to pro-
vide education at the state's expense did not make education the exclusive duty of
the state. See id.
349. For a further discussion of regulations counties impose on brothels, see
supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
350. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. The Rendell-Baker record did not show any
evidence that the state attempted to avoid its constitutional duties by disguising the
provision of public services as acts of private parties. See id. at n.7 (comparing
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966)).
351. See id. (noting two characteristics of state actors that Stud Farm fails to
satisfy).
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possess an estimated $500 billion in annual purchasing power.3 52
With the potential for adding such a huge financial market, it
seems like destructive business planning to exclude that kind of
money from a company, even if that company happens to be a
brothel. For sure, if something exists that Heidi Fleiss can never
resist, it is money.353 If the threat of legal action fails to prompt
Fleiss into rethinking her ban on male-to-male services, perhaps
$500 billion will.
Barbara B. Hill
352. See Harry F. Waters, Cable Comes Out of the Closet, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14,
1994, at 67 (offering estimated economic power homosexuals possess).
353. For a further discussion of Fleiss's passion for money, see supra notes 96,
99, 104 and accompanying text.
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